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RIGIDITY OF CONCEPT UTILIZATION AS A FUNCTION OF 
INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE DERIVATION
'CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The general problem in this study was to determine whether 
concepts differed in strength and rigidity according to whether 
they had been derived inductively (through direct, step-by-step 
experience with the referent of the concept) or deductively 
(through instructions, by formula, dictum, etc.). A special at­
tempt was also made to distinguish between concept rigidity and 
concept strength.
More specifically, concepts already mastered by subjects 
were studied. Subjects were led to develop a concept with res­
pect to the appropriateness or usefulness of another pre-existing 
concept, either inductively or deductively and at one of two ini­
tial levels of intended strength. The stimulus situation was then 
progressively altered to make the experimentally=prcduced concept 
increasingly inappropriate. The course or pattern of change in 
concept utilization was followed longitudinally in an attempt to 
separate a factor of concept rigidity from concept strength and
1
2to relate rigidity of concept utilization to the history of the 
formation of the concept.
It was expected that the deductive procedure would result 
in initially stronger concepts than would the inductive procedure, 
under the conditions of this experiment. It was also expected 
that concepts derived deductively would be utilized in a more rig­
id manner than those derived inductively. Finally, it was expect­
ed that discredited deductively-derived concepts would be more 
difficult to reinstate than discredited inductively-derived concepts.
Induction is used in this study in approximately the customary 
sense--as a label for learning through step-by-step, personal ex­
perience with the referent of the concept. Generalization from 
varied experience is implied, whether the subject is consciously 
aware of the generalization or not.
However, deduction is used in what may be considered a some­
what unusual sense--as a label for learning through instructions, 
by dictum or formula, etc., and some justification of this usage 
may be desirable. Sherif and Sherif (1956) have written:
Through the medium of language human beings can 
and do learn about the social and physical world they 
live in without always having direct, first-hand 
experience with all of its aspects. This possibility 
of a short cut in the laborious process of learning 
entirely through direct action and experience with 
every object and event has direct bearing on the socia­
lization process (Sherif & Sherif, 1956, pp. 450-451).
Many of our values or norms are internalized 
through the formation of attitudes by new members on 
the basis of formula, short-cut verbal dicta, or example
before they, have had sufficient or (in some cases) any 
actual encounter with the referents of these;attitudes.
That is, many social attitudes are formed deductively 
thrbugh formula rather than through step-by-step per­
sonal experience si th the objects encompassed in the 
value verdict of the norm (Sherif & Sherif, 1956, p. 496).
Another discussion of concept formation under various condi­
tions is that of Leeper(1951). He deals explicitly with concept 
formation under three headings--inductive, deductive, and inventive- 
suggesting that inventive concept formation may be just a special 
casé of inductive concept formation. He says of inductive concept 
formation:
What do we mean by inductive concept formation?
Partly we mean a process that is defined by what it 
produces— namely, concepts. It is the process of de­
veloping a habit or cognitive mechanism that permits 
a person to respond to an object or event in terms of 
some property of which he may or may not be immediately 
aware. By inductive concept formation we also mean the 
process by which concepts are formed. Inductively 
formed concepts originate in the experiences and obser­
vations that provide the organism with a wealth of 
perceptual materials. The process of inductive con­
cept formation, then, is the experiencing of one thing 
after another and the selective perception of certain 
aspects of the materials as common to several objects 
(Leeper, 1951, pp. 740-741).
With respect to deductive concept formation he says:
Deductive thinking, or deductive concept forma­
tion, is a very common process. We often fail to ap­
preciate this fact because we conceive of deductive 
thinking solely in terms of the fully stated syllogism. 
Actually it occurs most often in everyday life as the 
enthymeme. . . . The major premise is assumed, rather 
than stated. But psychologically it is playing its 
role as truly as though it were stated (Leeper, 1951, 
p. 748).
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tion, is a very common process. We often fail to ap­
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From this view of deduction, then, it follows that the conse­
quences of instructions in any psychological experiment rest on 
deductive processes in the subject--usually of an enthymeme nature. 
For example, if the experimenter informs subjects, as in this study 
"All of the following words have to do with food and eating," and 
if a subject reveals by his subsequent responses that he does, 
indeed, expect food-related words, something like the following 
must have intervened:
1. This person tells me the following will be food-related 
words.
2. He is a teacher (psychologist, parent, etc.).
3. Generally, what I am told by teachers (etc.) is true.
4. Therefore, all the following words must be food-related.
The intervening process is, of course, unlikely to have been
so formal or conscious in nature as the example might appear to 
indicate. However, to see that the consequence would be different 
if different premises intervened in the implicit deductive process, 
substitute "idiot," or "communist" in step 2, or substitute "false" 
for "true" in step 3. We know that effective instructions in any 
experiment must come from some at least superficially credible 
source or the instructions may result in contra-instruction 
expectations.
Other authors have also made very similar distinctions between 
inductive and deductive modes of concept formation, set or expectancy
production, etc. (though in different words). Among these are 
Allport (1955, p. 218), Bruner (1957, pp. 44-45), Festinger (1957, 
p. 130), Postman (1951, p. 263), and Vinacke (1952, p. 86).
Experiments Utilizing Inductively- and 
Deductively-Derived Concepts
It has long been recognized that concepts are some sort of 
learned cognitive products and that they may be learned in various 
ways. Sometimes concepts are learned in an inductive way--through 
sequential experiences with the referent or object of the concept. 
However, sometimes concepts are learned deductively--by formula or 
verbal dictum, without direct contact with the referent of the con­
cept. Although there are many indications in the experimental 
literature that history of concept formation may be a crucial de­
terminant of concept strength and rigidity, the specific effects 
are far from clear.
For example, early experiments on concepts underlying racial 
prejudice (e.£., Horowitz, 1936; Lasker, 1929) demonstrated that 
such concepts are less often built up inductively by contact with 
members of the out-group than deductively by learning the estab­
lished conceptions of the in-group. This particular example of 
deductively-derived concepts is generally considered an area of 
strong, rigid concepts (stereotypes), but it is still not known
whether this is a simple consequence of the ego-involvement of 
the individual with his group or, in part, a consequence of de­
ductive derivation of the concepts.
Other experiments such as those performed by Luchins (1942) 
have shown that strong concepts can also be built up inductively 
and that rigidity of utilization is frequently associated with 
these. However, in beeper's (1935) summary of a considerable 
experimental literature on inductive concept formation and a smal­
ler literature on deductive concept formation, he reports no re­
search in which the relative consequences of having derived the 
same or similar concepts inductively and deductively are qpmpared-- 
the object of the present study.
The experimental literature includes a large number of studies 
in which subjects have been led to derive concepts inductively or 
deductively. A few studies have used both procedures in the same 
experiment, though for different purposes than in the present study. 
Many examples of the induction procedure are found in summaries by 
Gibson(1953), by Luchins (1942; 1957), and in the extensive series 
reported by Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) . Experiments which 
have produced concepts through instructions provide, also, an ex­
tremely large number of examples of deductively-produced concepts, 
though for the most part they are unintentional examples. Some 
few experiments have used and evaluated deductive procedures as 
a focal aspect of the study.
The present study, in part, produces expections (concepts) 
that items to be presented will be members of a particular cate­
gory, through /lubject experiences with members of the category 
(^.e., inductively), a technique long in use in concept (e.£., Hull, 
1920) and set (e.£., Rees & Israel, 1935) investigations. More 
recent studies employing concapt-induction procedures are those of 
Maltzman and Morrisett (1952; 1953a; 1953b) and Postman and 
Crutchfield (1952). Studies by Blake and Vanderplas (1950-51) 
and Bruner and Postman (1949) also violate or discredit experi­
mentally-induced concepts--a procedure utilized in-the present 
experiment. These studies constitute, of course, only a small 
sample of early and recent research exploring various hypotheses 
and producing concepts inductively.
The present study also aims at production of expectations 
(concepts) deductively, and there are also early and later ex­
amples of this procedure in the experimental literature. Follow­
ing Kulpe'a early work on Aufgabe. Chapman (1932), among others, 
demonstrated the increased accuracy of reporting stimulus aspects 
to which attention had been called by instructions (deductive 
procedure, from the subject's point of view). Siipola (1935) and 
ZangTvill (1938) used instructions to produce an increased pre­
dictability of perception of ambiguous stimuli, and Leeper (1935) 
used "picture instructions" in his study of the pirate-rabbit, 
ambiguous drawing to produce a set for one or the other alternative.
In a variation on the experimental design used by Siipola 
(1935), Vinacke (1952, pp. 311-313) produced expections of cate­
gory words deductively (through instructions). Tachistoscopically- 
presented ambiguous stimuli were more frequently reported in the 
category that subjects had been instructed to expect than in other 
or neutral categories. Immediately following this part of the 
experiment, sets of "skeleton" words were distributed to the same 
subjects--ambiguous stimuli subject to completion in line with 
either an experimental category or in a noncategory way. Subjects 
again reported more items in categories they had been instructed 
to expect, although the second part of the experiment was presen­
ted to them as a separate unit— a speed test. The deductively- 
produced concepts, then, generalized to a similar task where it 
could not be said that subjects were simply following instructions 
for the task at hand. These examples of deductive concept forma­
tion, again, constitute only a small sample.
Some few studies have employed both inductively-achieved and 
deductively-achieved concepts in the same experimental design (as 
in the present study), but for different purposes. For example, 
Walter (1955) allowed expectations of extent of autokinetic move­
ment to arise inductively and then produced altered perceptions 
by means of deductive procedures--not once, but three times for 
each subject. Inductive and deductive procedures were employed 
sequentially and it was shown that concepts can be broken down, 
as well as formed, deductively.
Henle (1942) presented printwise and reverse order words 
tachlstoscoplcally and found that subjects recognized the reversed 
words with greater difficulty. However, vdien expectation of some 
reversed words was produced deductively (by instructions), the 
recognition advantage of the customary order was reduced. Hill
(1953) studied perceptual judgments in an experiment employing 
both deductive and inductive concept formation procedures. Judg­
ments of symmetry of specially-constructed figures were elicited. 
Half the subjects were "set" by instructions (deductively) for 
"above average symmetry," and half were uninstructed. Within 
each of these experimental groups half the subjects were provi­
ded a standard of "average symmetry," i.e., direct experience with 
the referent of the concept. It was expected that the deductively- 
produced concept would become ineffectual or would be reduced in 
influence when stimulus ambiguity was reduced by the inductive 
experience. Although the hypothesis received only marginal sup­
port, the influence of the deductively-produced concept was highly 
significant.
These studies by Henle (1942), Hill (1953), and Walter (1955) 
demonstrate the interaction of inductive and deductive processes 
in concept formation and change. They also provide evidence sug­
gestive of the greater relative potency or efficacy of deductive 
procedures as compared with inductive procedures.
Maltzman and Morrisett (1953b) incorporated a training pro­
cedure (inductive) and set instructions (deductive) in the same
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design, producing expectations that anagram solutions would fall* 
Into "nature” and "order” solution categories. All subjects solved 
twenty anagram problems In one category or the other, and half of
each group were also Instructed that It would help to look for
category words--by category name. No subjects were given a con­
cept deductively In the absence of Inductive evidence for the same
concept. Effectiveness of the concepts thus produced was tested
with a set of fifteen ambiguous anagrams capable of solution 
either In line with concept or not.
Both Inductive and deductive concepts produced significant 
effects In the expected direction In the test series. Also, those 
given both inductive and deductive evidence produced significantly 
more category responses on the test series than those given induc­
tive training only. However, since no subjects received deductive 
evidence only prior to the ambiguous test series, no comparison of
the relative efficacy of the two procedures was possible.
• ■
In a study by Postman and Leytham (%951), personality trait 
names were presented tachlstoscoplcally to two groups of subjects. 
After three practice words, one group was allowed to develop a set 
for the category words by responding to an unbroken series of twelve 
such words (Inductive procedure). The other group was told to ex­
pect trait names after the three practice words, and then they 
responded to the same sequence of category words (deductive con­
cept formation, followed by Inductive confirmation). No subjects
11
experienced a deductive procedure without unequivocal inductive 
confirmation before testing. An expectation for category words 
was developed in both groups (lowered recognition thresholds) , 
and it developed more rapidly for the instructed subjects.
An additional feature of particular interest in the Postman 
and Leytham (1951) study was a test for differential persistence 
of set in the two groups at the end of the series of category words. 
Two noncategory words ware presented, violating subject expecta­
tions. Recognition thresholds were significantly elevated for 
the first of these noncategory stimuli, constituting a measure of 
the strength of the expectation for category items. Presentation 
of the second noncategory stimulus resulted in a significant de­
crease in recognition threshold. These results were seen in each 
experimental subgroup, but differences between groups were not 
significant. The authors report:
In neither case, however, is the difference 
between differences significant. . . . The relative 
amount of rise and fall in thresholds, then, is not 
significantly different for the two groups.
These results clearly illustrate the effect of 
selective set on perceptual discrimination, regard­
less of whether the set is induced by explicit 
instructions or is built up through experiences 
(Postman & Leytham, 1951, pp. 402-403). (Italics mine)
It should be noted that with only two noncategory items at the end
of the concept production series it would be difficult to recognize
any differential effects of concept formation procedures on the
course or pattern of change.
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In Che studies by Maltzman and Mortiset (1953b) and Postman 
and Leytham (1951) the experimental design was similar, up to the 
additional test described above in connection with the latter study. 
Expectations for items of a category were induced in all subjects 
through their own direct experience with items of the category.
Half the subjects in each experiment were also instructed, prior 
to the inductive experience, to expect category items. Tests of 
the expectations thus generated revealed stronger expectations by 
preinstructed subjects in both studies. Postman and Leytham (1951) 
made an additional test of concept strength by violating the sub­
jects' expectations, and found no differences to be associated 
with method of concept formation.
The studies summarized above offer considerable evidence on 
the strength of expectations generated deductively, but no evi­
dence on whether concepts differ in rigidity (as seen in the pat­
tern of change) according to whether they were derived inductively 
or deductively.
Strength and Rigidity of Concepts 
end Ego-Involvement
The very large experimental and theoretical literature on 
attitude change and change of set provides many examples of a 
continuing interest in topics of concept strength and rigidity, 
e^.g., Sherif and Sherif (1956, Ch, 16) and summaries by Luchins
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(1942; 1947; 1957), and Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953). The 
studies described in these sources have examined the influence of 
a large number of independent variables on change of concepts and 
have employed, as well, a large number of dependent variables in 
measuring content, direction, and position, or intensity, strength, 
and rigidity. For the most part, conclusions have been based on 
comparisons of (usually two) point-in-time measures, although some 
studies have attempted to follow the course of change in a syste­
matic way. Studies have also varied greatly in the extent to which 
they have attempted to utilize controlled "laboratory" conditions 
or to approximate realistic "field" conditions.
In a number of the studies mentioned in the preceding section, 
concept strength was utilized in making predictions about change 
or was inferred from change (or resistance to change), e .£.,
Henle (1942), Hill (1953), Maltzman and Morrisett (1952; 1953a; 
1953b), and Postman and Crutchfield (1952). Kelly (1957) has 
documented the typicality of such experimental procedures. Among 
the many studies reporting that concept strength accounts for re­
sistance to change are those of Buss (1950), Dittes and Kelley 
(1956), Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (1957), and Kelley and Volkart 
(1952).
However, not all researchers agree that resistance to change 
is a function of concept strength. Some studies have emphasized 
external, rather than internal, factors, viz.. amount or degree of
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change proposed or attempted. Examples are the studies of Ewing 
(1942), Goldberg (1954), and Hovland and Pritzker (1957). Harvey, 
Kelley and Shapiro (1957) combined the two propositions in their 
report that initial attitude strength was negatively related to 
change but that for both strong and weak attitudes greater change 
was associated with larger proposed changes.
The studies of concept change just mentioned made no distinc­
tion between concept strength and concept rigidity. It was assumed 
where there was any interest in rigidity, that a strong concept was 
a rigid one, i^.e., resistant to change. The theoretical views of 
Allport (1955), Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955), and Postman (1951) 
also deal with strength or intensity of concepts as a unitary 
factor.
Other researchers have been specifically concerned with be­
havioral rigidity, and controversy in this area has revolved 
largely around the issue of generality or specificity of the 
rigid behavior--that is, whether behavioral rigidity is situa­
tional or determined by personality factors of the individual. 
Associated with the personality point of view have been Aderno, 
et al. (1950), Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), and Rokeach (1948), among 
others. Luchins (1947) and Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) 
have reported intrapersonal consistencies which were not referred 
to personality rigidity. Resistance to the "personality viewpoint" 
has come from Luchins (1949; 1951; 1957) and Goodstein (1953),
15
among others. Factor analytic studies (e.£., Cattell & Tiner,
1949; Cattell & Winder, 1952; Kleemeier & Dudek, 1950) yielded 
largely negative or equivocal results in attempts to isolate "pure" 
rigidity and flexibility factors.
Among the many studies which document the importance of situ­
ational factors as determinants of behavioral rigidity are those of 
Blake and Vanderplas (1950-51), Eckstrand and Wickens (1954), Wyatt 
and Campbell (1951), and Youtz (1948). Although the specificity- 
generality issue is not focal for present purposes, a number of 
relevant experiments have been motivated by the controversy, cf., 
review by Taylor and McNemar (1955).
The question has not been subject to any simple or easy solu­
tion in the either-or form in which it has so often been posed, and 
a great many research findings and theoretical considerations argue 
for changing the form of the specificity-generality question to 
"under what conditions." It has long been recognized that the be­
havior of individuals becomes more consistent when the individual 
becomes more ego-involved. Operationally, of course, the differ­
entiation between "consistency" and "rigidity" depends on whether 
the perseveration of response is seen as meeting the demands of 
the situation or not (cf., Woodworth & Schlossberg, 1954, p. 830).
Summaries of relevant research findings are found in Sherif 
and Sherif (1956, pp. 580-591), and additional experimental find­
ings also lend support to the view that the conditions under which
16
response perseveration tends to generalize to increasingly dissimi­
lar stimulus situations are conditions of ego-involvement, e.£., 
Brown (1953), Cowen and Thompson (1951), and Pitcher and Stacey
(1954).
Consistency (or rigidity) of behavior varies, then, with de­
gree of ego-involvement, and under extremely high degrees of ego- 
involvement experience and behavior become extremely rigid. Such 
influences from prejudice and stereotypes are well known, and a 
recent report by Festinger, Riecken, and Schacter (1958) provides 
another striking example.
In view of these considerations, the present study was pur­
posely designed to produce only a low level, if any, ego-involve­
ment. Also, an attempt was made to control for this factor by 
attributing all information supplied to subjects to a single 
source— the experimenter. However, it is not contended that ego- 
involvement was necessarily fully controlled thereby.
Dependent Variables in Studies of Concept 
Strength and Rigidity
Since it was a primary objective of the present experiment 
to demonstrate a difference between concept strength and concept 
rigidity, the choice of dependent variables became crucial. In 
the studies reviewed above, those in which concept strength was 
intentionally varied or intentionally measured have failed to
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distinguish between strength and rigidity. Rigidity was viewed 
simply as consequence of strength. The results of those which ex­
plored problems of behavioral rigidity are understandable in terms 
of differential ego-involvement or concept strength. It is pro­
posed in the present study that a factor of concept rigidity is 
separable from concept strength, and that one of the variables 
(probably only one of many) which influences concept rigidity (or 
rigidity of utilization of concepts) is the history of formation 
of the concept--particularly, whether it was derived inductively 
or deductively.
One reason for the failure to recognize that not one factor, 
but two, are involved has been an emphasis on measures of net 
change--comparison of (usually two) point-in-time measures--which 
has tended to obscure any difference in the course of change of 
concepts. Recognition of the importance of longitudinal studies 
is not, of course, new. Some early (e.£., Piaget, 1932), and more 
recent research (e.jg,., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958; Sherif & Sherif, 1956, Ch. 6 and 9) has syste­
matically followed the course of concept change over time. How­
ever, none has explored the problem of the present study, and it 
remains true that the bulk of research in attitude-change and 
change-of-set areas has utilized measures of net change as derived 
from (usually two) points-in-time measures (cf., Kelley, 1957, 
p. 230; Luchins, 1957, p. 97).
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With the dependent variable handled in this way, an impor­
tant possibility may be overlooked. It may be that two individuals 
holding the same concept with apparently the same initial strength 
or intensity may change their concepts in the same net amount dur­
ing an experiment, but do so in very different ways. If one person 
responds realistically to changing stimulus conditions--adjusting 
his conceptions accordingly--and the other resists change until the 
last moment--changing rapidly when he does--both will be repre­
sented by the same numerical value in the net change data.
There are grounds in both the experimental literature (e.£., 
Sherif & Sherif, 1956, pp. 553-554) and in everyday observations 
to suggest a definition of concept rigidity in terms of an initial 
resistance to change, followed by large or rapid change--when change 
does occur. We notice, for instance, that people in arguments some­
times seem to hold the same attitude with equal intensity, but one 
will adjust and adapt his notions as the discussion reveals new 
facts, while the other resists loudly, evades the issue if possible, 
but also changes his notions (and suddenly) when the evidence 
against his position becomes overwhelming. In terms of initial 
and terminal measures, the strength of the two individuals' con­
cepts would appear to be the same. We have noticed, however, that 
the pattern of change differed radically in the two instances and 
that the instance of initial resistance followed by sudden change 
fits some connotations of the term "rigidity," viz., apparent
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strength, but actual brittleness, vulnerability, fragility.
Some experiments have come close to the distinction pro­
posed here, but none have demonstrated it in clear-cut fashion, 
and some researchers have even concluded that their data support 
no distinction between concept strength and concept rigidity.
For example, Guetzkow (1951) attempted an experimental separation 
of "susceptibility to set" (measured as strength of set produced) 
and "ability to overcome set" (flexibility). Differences between 
the two measures were not significant, necessitating the conclu­
sion that results were explainable in terms of one factor, not 
two.
In view of the research summarized above, it would appear 
that if there are, in fact, two factors (strength and rigidity) 
inferable from dependent measures in concept-change studies, 
rather than a single factor (strength, intensity, energy), cer­
tain stringent requirements are placed on an experimental design 
which proposes a separation of the factors. It was necessary to 
start the test procedure with concepts of equal measured strengths, 
produce equal change in the concepts, and show that the course or 
pattern of change differed significantly for the more rigid con­
cepts .
The dependent variables chosen for the present study revealed 
concept change longitudinally--the process or pattern of change. 
Utilizing these dependent measures, in the required design.
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hypotheses were tested with respect to the differential associa­
tion of concept strength and concept rigidity with inductive and 
deductive concept derivations, at two levels of initial concept 
strength.
The hypotheses specified below were tested in an experimental 
design in which concepts (expectations that stimuli would be mem­
bers of a specified conceptual category) were produced (experimenter 
viewpoint) or achieved (subject viewpoint). They were produced at 
two initial levels--"All" and "Most" expectations--and by two ex­
perimental procedures— "Deduction" (instructions) and "Induction" 
(prior response to category items). Following a test of concept 
strength, all subjects experienced identical stimulus conditions 
designed to discredit or invalidate the experimentally-produced 
concepts, i.e., to produce change. Finally, concepts having been 
experimentally produced and discredited for all subjects, an at­
tempt was made to reinstate the discredited concepts.
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis jL. Under the experimental conditions of this 
study, deductively-derived concepts are stronger than inductively- 
derived concepts. Tests of the hypothesis are made at both "All" 
and "Most" levels of initial expectation.
Hypothesis 2. Concepts change--are discredited--under the 
specified stimulus conditions, regardless of initial strength or 
method of production.
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Hypothesis Deductively-derived concepts are more rigid 
or inflexible under pressure-to-change than inductively-derived 
concepts of equal initial strength. That is, concepts achieved 
deductively exhibit rigidity by resisting change more, early in 
the course of change, but change more rapidly than do^inductively- 
achieved concepts, late in the course of change.
This hypothesis and the one to follow are tested only in con­
nection with data from subjects who actually arrived at the inten­
ded initial levels of concept strength.
Hypothesis 4. Deductively-derived concepts, when discredited, 
are more difficult to reinstate than inductively-derived concepts.
CHAPTER II
SUBJECTS, STIMULUS CONDITIONS, AND PROCEDURE
Sub iects
Subjects for this experiment were undergraduate students at 
Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas. A sample 
of 370 male and female, sophomore and junior subjects was used in 
the standardization of stimulus conditions. An additional sample 
of 137 was used in pretesting instructions and in testing adequacy 
of experimental procedures and controls. The experimental sample 
was composed of 320 male and female freshman students enrolled in 
English courses. Experimental data from fourteen subjects who 
submitted incomplete response records are not included in this 
number. In the experimental sample 182 subjects (57%) either 
read or spoke more than one language.
Subjects were distributed over five groups--rour experimental 
groups and one control group. It was expected that more subjects 
would arrive at stipulated concept strengths under Deduction than 
under Induction procedures. Therefore, a relatively larger number 
of subjects was assigned to the Induction procedure (90 in each 
subgroup as compared with 50 in eachaDeddction subgroup and 40 
in the Control group).
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Stimulus Conditions
Tests of the hypotheses in this experiment required a large 
class of stimuli to each of which could be assigned response proba­
bilities by some reliable standardization procedure. A decision 
was made to use skeleton words (some letters missing) as the stimu­
lus objects with respect to which a concept was to be produced, 
discredited, and reinstated. The stimuli had to be chosen from 
some large word category, responses to which were subject to 
unambiguous scoring, , clearly assignable to category or non­
category classes. The category chosen had to be one which subjects 
customarily use, so that clear-cut positive expectations might be 
produced. This meant, of course, that a verbal category was re­
quired which relates to some strong and persistent motivational 
factors for speakers of the language.
A number of such word categories were explored and rejected 
for these purposes for one reason or another, e, £., category too 
small or not sufficiently familiar to large numbers of subjects, 
difficulties in scoring responses, etc. The category finally 
chosen for use in this experiment was the "food and food-related 
words" category used by Postman and Crutchfield (1952). It satis­
fies criteria for size, familiarity, and assurance in scoring 
responses. It is, of course, known that perceptual tendencies 
with respect to such stimuli are subject to influence by the de­
gree of hunger of the individual at the time of response. However,
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this factor can be controlled, and the manner in which this was 
accomplished is described below.
Choice of food-related words as the conceptual category has 
the additional advantage of making possible some comparison of 
response probabilities with similar standardizations in a previous 
experiment by Postman and Crutchfield (1952). Hereafter, "food 
and food-related" words will be referred to as "category words; 
all others, as "noncategory words. The "noncategory" label 
should not be taken to mean that associations with food cannot 
occur, but merely that they are considerably more remote than for 
"category" words. For example, "black" might arouse images of a 
field of licorice for some particular individual, but this associ­
ation is considerably less likely than that "fish" or "kitchen" 
will be thought of as intimately related to food and eating.
In the stimulus standardization procedure, four lists of 
120 skeleton words each were constructed and administered to 370 
subjects, so as to make available a large number of both category 
and noncategory items for which would be known the probabilities 
of category response, noncategory response, ambiguity (difference 
between these), and difficulty (nonresponse). Each of four stimu­
lus standardization lists contained the same sixty noncategory 
skeletons combined with one or the other of two sets of sixty 
category skeletons. Two forms contained the same sixty category 
skeletons in two random orders. Two other forms contained a
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different set of sixty category skeletons combined with the same 
sixty noncategory skeletons, and again in two random orders, so as 
to make possible an estimate of the extent to which particular 
skeletons were subject to "order" effects. That is, if a particu­
lar stimulus elicited widely different proportions of category and 
noncategory responses according to its place in a series of such 
stimuli, its usefulness for this experiment would be questionable.
Standardization data are available on 120 category skeletons-- 
68 from the previous study (Postman & Crutchfield, 1952) and 52 
newly constructed--and on 60 noncategory skeletons (all newly con­
structed) . The 370 stimulus standardization subjects were distri­
buted over the four lists of stimulus items in approximately equal 
numbers. The lists were administered to intact classes meeting at 
9:00 and 10:00 A.M. and at 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. so as to control 
for relevant motivational factors. The following instructions were 
given orally prior to distribution of stimulus materials:
I'll ask you to take just a few minutes to help me 
with an experiment on reading. At the moment, I'm just 
trying to find out how much of the printed word people 
really need to see in order to know what the word is, 
and whether some words are easier to recognize than 
others.
I will hand you some sheets stapled together, on 
which there are some "skeleton'' words--that is, words 
with some letters missing. You are asked to insert 
letters in the blanks so as to make English words of 
the skeletons. Two letters are needed to complete 
each word. Avoid slang and proper names. Give the 
first solution that occurs to you and work rapidly. I 
am not interested in the correctness of your spelling.
Are there any questions?
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Subjects were allowed to use as much as 25 minutes on the task 
(which proved sufficient), and then the lists were collected.
Responses were scored as "category," "noncategory," "nonword," 
and "nonresponse" for each of the category stimuli, and these were 
tabulated. For noncategory stimuli, 370 responses each were avail­
able; for the category stimuli, approximately 185 per word, since 
each of these appeared on only two of the four lists. Consequently, 
in the standardization procedure, some 44,400 responses were col­
lected. Category skeleton responses were tabulated as described 
above, and responses to noncategory skeletons were tabulated for 
difficulty (nonresponse) only, since they had been constructed so 
that no category response to them was possible.
In the scoring of responses spelling constituted a problem.
It proved necessary in a preliminary test preceding formal stan­
dardization procedures to deemphasize spelling in Instructions to 
subjects because otherwise subjects completed only those items 
they were completely certain they could spell correctly. Fortunately, 
the local misspellings follow a fairly consistent pattern, and the 
intent ot a particular spelling could be elicited by questioning 
subjects. One stimulus, r_d_sh, had to be discarded because about 
half the subjects who completed it "redish" meant "radish" and 
about half meant "reddish." For "dessert," two misspellings were 
accepted— "dissert" and "dessart"--since subjects consistently 
classified it as a food word. Other examples of misspellings
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accepted as category Items in scoring both standardization and 
experimental responses were: "leatuce" for "lettuce," "sousage"
for "sausage," "tamato" for "tomato," etc. No stimuli were in­
cluded in the experimental series on which there were unresolved 
scoring problems.
In the process of scoring, six category skeletons were dis­
carded when unambiguous scoring proved impossible. These were 
found in both the newly constructed skeletons and in those used in 
the previous study (Postman & Crutchfield, 1952). For example, is 
the response "orange" a fruit or a color; does "grain" refer to 
cereal or texture, etc? The remaining sample of 114 category 
stimuli are listed in Appendixes A and B with their associated 
probabilities (percentages) of category responses, noncategory 
responses, and nonresponses. Appendix A contains the newly con­
structed stimuli. Appendix B includes only those stimuli also 
standardized previously (Postman & Crutchfield, 1952). The separa­
tion was provided in order to facilitate reference in the event of 
employment of these items in subsequent research.
Two possible measures of "difficulty" were available— the non­
response percentages for each stimulus and the nonresponse plus 
nonword response percentages. Nonword responses were subject at­
tempts which could not be recognized as an English word. It was 
impossible to know whether subjects were satisfied with their 
responses in this latter scoring category or whether they recog­
nized that their response did not make a word. Consequently, the
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percentage of nonresponse (blanks) was taken as best available 
measure of experienced difficulty for each stimulus. (Nonword 
responses did not exceed 5 percent for any stimulus skeleton in­
cluded in the experimental series.)
It was also desired, as mentioned above, to eliminate those 
stimuli subject to large "order" effects, since a constant rather 
than a random ordering was to be maintained in the experimental 
presentation of stimuli. Each category stimulus appeared on two 
lists in a different position, making available two independent 
estimates of the probability of category response. A statistical 
test was made, for each stimulus, as to whether the two sample pro­
portions could have been obtained from a population having the same 
probability of category response and might, therefore, be legiti­
mately combined into a single estimate of standardized response prob­
ability. An appreciable difference between sample proportions would 
indicate order effects of a magnitude that would make that item un­
satisfactory for inclusion in the experimental series.
A test of the two-sided alternative (that either sample propor­
tion is larger than the other) was made in terms of the standardized 
normal variable by means of the test, "Comparing Two Sample Propor­
tions" (Wallis & Roberts, 1956, pp. 429-431). The results of this 
test appear in Appendixes A and B.
Those stimuli for which the probability was <.20 that the two 
sample proportions had come from a single population (in terms of
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category response percentage) were discarded as subject to "too 
large" order effects. While the choice of the .20 cutting point 
was, In a sense, arbitrary. It was dictated by the necessity of re­
taining enough stimuli to conduct the experiment. It Is not con­
tended that order effects have been eliminated but merely that 
they have been reduced Insofar as possible.
Sample proportions were then combined to obtain estimates 
for the remaining 67 skeletons which are shown In Appendix C. 
Stimuli are listed In order of decreasing probability of category 
response. An estimate of ambiguity has also been calculated for 
each stimulus, and this Is Included In Appendix C. The more the 
probabilities of category and noncategory responses approach each 
other, the more ambiguous the stimulus becomes. The measure of 
ambiguity adopted was, therefore, the difference between percentage 
of category response and percentage of noncategory response.
Since It was also desired^hat the difficulty (probability 
of nonresponse) not differ greatly from one part of the experimen­
tal series to another, this Information (presented In Appendix C) 
was also utilized In the final selection of stimuli for this study.
It was also considered desirable to estimate whether, or to 
what extent, the standardization procedure had Induced a set for 
category words, since category responses were possible to fully 
half the Items responded to by each subject. Although no subject 
gave as many as sixty category responses, all subjects gave a
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considerable number, and it seemed likely that, particularly for 
stimuli appearing later in the lists, some positive expectation 
for category words might have been induced by prior category res­
ponses. If this were true, biased response probabilities for at 
least some stimuli would be indicated. ^
A number of tests for selective set were possible under the 
circumstances. As a test on those stimuli most likely to show 
such effects, the stimuli were selected which had, by chance, 
appeared in the first fourth on one list and the last fourth on 
the other. There were fourteen such instances. The "Signed Rank 
Test" (Wallis & Roberts, 1956, pp. 596-598) was used to determine 
whether a higher percentage of category responses was associated 
with the later appearance of the same stimulus than with the 
earlier. The smaller rank total was 47.5. At n = 14, a rank 
total <21 is required for significance at the .05 level of con­
fidence.
The possibility remains, however, that a milder set may have 
existed over all the stimuli and might not have been revealed at 
n = 14 for the most extreme items. To test this possibility, all 
stimuli were used. Category response percentages were compared 
for those skeletons appearing in the first half of the list and 
those appearing in the last half of the list, using the "Rank 
Order Test" (Edwards, 1954, pp. 417-422). The difference in rank 
totals was only 2, indicating again, no operation of selective set.
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As a final check, the more ambiguous skeletons (between 25 
and 75 percent category responses) were selected from the above 
items as more likely to reveal selective set. The same statisti­
cal test resulted in a smaller sum of rank differences = 44, which 
is associated with no difference of measures with P .60. It 
was concluded, therefore, that no selective set for category res­
ponses was operating in the standardization procedure and that 
the standardized category response probabilities provide an estimate 
unbiased by selective set. This concurs with a similar finding 
in the previous study (Postman & Crutchfield, 1952) utilizing a 
similar standardization procedure.
Finally, as a check on the standardization procedure, the 
determined probabilities of category response for the 67 stimuli 
listed in Appendix C were divided into previously-used and newly- 
constructed groups. There were 39 stimuli previously standardized 
but unfortunately only broad ranges of response probabilities are 
given in the published report and a correlation could not be com­
puted. However, a rough comparison was possible. Of the four 
skeletons with an estimated probability of category response near 
1.00 in the previous study, the present standardization resulted 
in a mean estimate of .88. In this instance, and in several others, 
the difference might be expected in terms of the subjects for which 
the probabilities were standardized. The particular stimulus 
responsible for this discrepancy was lun  (to which the category
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response is "lunch"). For the sample of "Easterners" in the pre­
vious study, the probability was approximately 1.00, but for the 
present sample of "Southwesterners" (for whom the noonday meal is 
still often "dinner") the probability was only .69.
For the 13 skeletons earlier found to fall between category 
response probabilities of .01 and .10, the present mean estimate 
was .13 (with nine falling in the expected range and none higher 
than .17). For the 10 skeletons falling in the expected range of 
.21 - .35, the present mean estimate was .38, and for the 12 skele­
tons falling in the expected .41 - .80 range, the present mean 
estimate was .595. There is, then a high degree of correspondence 
between the category response probability estimates of the previous 
and present standardizations, providing by means of this external 
check some additional confidence in the standardization procedures 
used in the present experiment.
The 45 category skeletons selected for use in this experiment 
from those available in Appendix C are shown in Table 1 in eight 
sets of ten each. Some category skeletons appear in more than 
one set, though not in any two sets responded to by the same sub­
ject. Category skeletons have been supplemented with 17 noncate­
gory skeletons according to the requirements of the experimental 
design.
Noncategory skeletons were chosen from those used in the 
standardization lists as "padding"--to avoid induction of an
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Table 1
Sets of Stimuli Utllsed In Experimental Procedures
Page* Set Category
Items
Skeleton Words
1 la p r _ b 1 _ m
8 t _ d _  u m
u _ l v _ r s e
c o _ P _  n y
f " 9 _  r
y e 1 _ o _
V c a t  o n
b ”  k
___f l c l a l
w ___k
1 lb c l e ___u c e
c k 1 _ c h _ n
c b _ n _ n a
c d 8 s r t
c k e t _ 1 _
c g r  a p e ___ u 1 t
c c ___k 1 e
c c a ___a g e
c _ u r n _  p
c a s p a r a _ u _ _
1 Ic c l e ___u c e
c k 1 _ c h _ n
c b _ n _ n a
c d _ s s _  r t
p r _ b 1 _ m
c k e t _ i _
c g r a p e ___u l  t
y e 1 _ o _
c c a ___a g e
c c ___k 1 e
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Table 1 (Continued)
Sets of Stimuli Utilized in Experimental Procedures
Page Category
Items
Skeleton Words
c h n g _ r
c s a 1
c s c e
c p e e r
c b e d
c e f
c a k
c a o n
c t a t
c s — e — k
c p m
c b r n h
c b t
c a i n g
c s t e r
c r a
c 0 k
c s 1
c r i P
c s — - w
c i n
h s b a n
c e d
a e m b
c Î c
s t g
c h 8
c t
c P r
e a h
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Table 1 (Continued)
Sets of Stimuli Utilized in Experimental Procedures
Page* Set Category
Items
Skeleton Words
3 3 c 1 1 g e
w n d w
u c c e s
c o r d
m r d e
r s r Ï
S r P
d Î a r
s k I
P 0 — i c —
6 6 c a V y
c b e
c V Î
c a e
c u It e r
c h n e r
c s q u s
c m a
c s P n
c f i
"Page" refers to the order of presentation of stimulus sets 
to subjects in all experimental groups. Page 1 varies (sets la, 
lb, and Ic) according to procedures described below. All subjects 
experienced the same stimuli on pages 2, 3, 4, 3, and 6.
expectancy for category stimuli. Those listed above in Table 1 
were chosen by three criteria: remoteness of food associations,
relative ease for subjects (difficulty or nonresponse < 5% on all 
used), and in order to "mix them up," ^.e., to avoid inducing 
expectatiohs of some new category in the process of invalidating
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expectations of food-related items. These items are all those of 
Sets la and 5, pr_bl_m and yel_o_ on Set Ic, and h_sban_, a embly, 
St_S_, c t, and ea_h on set 4. Their contribution to mean cate­
gory response probabilities shown in Table 2 is zero.
Table 2
Standardized Mean Response Probabilities of the 
Experimental Sets of Skeleton Words
Set Category" Noncategory Difficulty
1 a .00 > .95 < .05
1 b .92 .00 .04
1 c .75 .19 .03
2 .36 .37 .18
3 .13 .69 .12
4 .02 .87 .08
5 .00 > .95 < .05
6 .43 .39 .10
Mean response probabilities do not total 1.00 since non­
word responses have been excluded for reasons described above.
Standardized response probabilities for stimuli have been 
combined to provide mean estimates of stimulus characteristics of 
the sets of ten skeleton words. These appear in Table 2. The
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manner in which these sets of standardized stimuli were ordered 
and presented to subjects is specified in detail in the section 
on procedure.
Two estimates of mean ambiguity of the stimulus sets are pre­
sented in Table 3. Entries in the "Mean of Differences" column 
were obtained by computing the difference between probability of 
category response and probability of noncategory response for each
Table 3
Measures of Mean Ambiguity (Equiprobability of Category and 
Noncategory Response) of the Experimental Sets of 
Skeleton Words
Set Mean of 
Differences
Difference 
Between Means
1 a 1.00* 1.00*
1 b 1.00* 1.00*
1 c 1.00* 1.00*
2 .18 .01
3 .55 .56
4 .87 .85
5 1.00* 1.00*
6 .49 .04
These estimates of 1.00 or minimal ambiguity, result from 
the impossibility of both category and noncategory responses to 
any one skeleton in the set.
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item in a set, adding these figures, and dividing by 10. Entries 
in the "Differences between Means" column are differences between 
the mean probabilities of category responses and noncategory res­
ponses as shown in Table 2, for each stimulus set. For both esti­
mates, the smaller the table entry, the greater the mean ambiguity 
of the set in this special meaning of ambiguity.
Although the absolute magnitudes of these estimates differ, 
both show the necessary trend from ambiguity on Set 2 skeletons 
to increasing clarity or certainty of noncategory response over 
Sets 3, 4, and 5. The striking difference between the two esti­
mates of ambiguity on Set 6 was occasioned by the necessity of 
using in this set the remaining stimuli which were less ambiguous 
than those used in Set 2. That is, equiprobability of category 
and noncategory response to the set was obtained for Set 2 pri­
marily by choice of skeletons with about equal probability of 
category and noncategory response. In set 6, it was obtained more 
by choosing equal numbers of stimuli to which category response 
probabilities were relatively high and relatively low.
Procedure
A particular packet of six sets of ten skeleton words each 
was responded to by subjects according to the experimental (or 
control) group to which each subject was assigned. Each set of 
ten stimuli appeared on a single, mimeographed sheet along with 
the appropriate instructions' for responding to the stimulus
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materials. Six sheets were stapled together in specified order 
(see Table 4) to make a packet appropriate to each of the con­
ditions.
Table 4
Sets of Stimulus Materials Composing Stimulus 
Conditions for Experimental and 
Control Groups
Group page 1 page 2 page 3 page 4 page 5 page 6
Control la 2 3 4 5 6
Deductive-
All la 2 3 4 5 6
Deductive-
Most la 2 3 4 5 6
Inductive-
All lb 2 3 4 5 6
Inductive-
Most Ic 2 3 4 5 6
Following general instructions for all subjects (see below), 
these packets of stimulus materials were distributed to subjects in 
intact classes. The five experimental packets were distributed in 
mixed order, so that subjects sitting next to each other would re­
spond to different, group-specific instructions and stimuli in order 
that independence of results from different subjects in the same 
classroom might be maximized. This procedure offered the additional 
advantage of controlling for any factors relating to particular
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classroom groups of subjects since all experimental conditions 
were represented in the responses of each classroom group.
The relevant motivational factor with respect to the stimuli 
utilized in this experiment was hunger. In order to control for 
any differential effects of this variable, only "between-meals" 
classes were used--9:00 and 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 and 3:00 P.M.-- 
as in the stimulus standardization proceuures.
The general instructions given orally to all subjects prior 
to distribution of stimulus materials were as follows:
I'll ask you to take just a few minutes to help me 
with an experiment on reading--or maybe better, on 
reading materials. You are not being tested. You are 
testing the reading materials. Consequently, do not 
put your names on your papers.
At the moment. I'm just trying to find out how 
much of a printed word people really need to see in 
order to know what the word is, whether some words are 
easier to recognize than others, and whether it helps 
to have an idea of what kinds of words to expect.
I will hand you some sheets, stapled together, on 
which there are some "skeleton" words--that is, words 
with some letters missing. For example, if I write 
(demonstration on blackboard) W _ L K, you may recog­
nize it as "walk," and if I write T ___ K, you may see
"talk." Now, if you came into a classroom and saw this
on the board, what would you read? N _ C L _____
T _ D _ Y (waiting for subject responses, "no class to­
day.") I'm kidding, of course, but it does show that 
you really don't need to see very much of a word or 
phrase to recognize what it is.
On the sheets of skeleton words that I will hand 
you, there are ten words on each of six sheets stapled to­
gether. I'll ask you to complete the skeletons in or­
der by filling in the missing letters. That is, on each 
separate sheet, fill in the words in any order you like, 
but once you have gone on to the next sheet, please do 
not turn back to any sheet you have finished.
Each of you will get a somewhat different set of 
skeletons. The instructions for going about the task
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are printed on the sheets with the words, and they will 
also be different for different people. In other words, 
the person on each side of you has somewhat different 
skeletons and instructions. So just read the printed 
instructions on your sheets and complete your skeleton 
words. Resist the natural temptation to check with your 
neighbor till everyone finishes.
Don't worry about spelling. Just come as close as 
you can. If you come to a word you don't know. Just pass 
it and go on.
Are there any questions? (Waiting for questions)
If you should have a question after you start, hold up 
your hand and I will come to you so as not to disturb 
the others.
Printed at the top of each mimeographed first sheet were addi­
tional general instructions which were the same for all subjects:
INSTRUCTIONS: Insert letters in the blanks to
make English words of the following "skeleton" words.
Two letters are needed to complete each word. Avoid 
slang and proper names. Give the first solution that 
occurs to you and work rapidly.
At the bottom of each sheet except the last, in all packets, 
were instructions to continue on to the next page and a request 
that subjects PLEASE DO NOT turn back to any previous sheet. At 
the bottom of the last sheet in each packet were instructions to 
turn the packet over and wait quietly for other subjects to finish. 
Special instructions for Deduction and Induction subjects, printed 
at the top of first and second sheets, appear below in connection 
with description of experimental conditions for the various groups.
Special instructions designed to produce a concept deductively 
in two degrees of strength were printed below the general instruc­
tions at the top of page one and at the top of page two. On page 
one appeared:
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The words on this sheet are to give you some 
practice.
At the top of page two the following appeared for Deduction-All 
subjects:
You are given a HINT about the "skeleton" words 
to follow. ALL of the words on this sheet and on 
the sheets to follow have to do with FOOD and EATING.
Special instructions for Deduction-Most subjects were the same ex­
cept for the substitution of "MOST" for "ALL."
Inductive concept production instructions appearing below the 
general instructions at the top of page one were as follows:
A HINT is contained in the words below as to the 
class or kind of words to be found on each of the 
following pages.
No special instructions were given at the top of the second page 
for Induction subjects. The concept was induced in All and Most 
strengths by "forced" response to ten of ten and eight of ten 
category items, respectively, on page one.
Control subjects responded to the same set of "practice" 
(noncategory) skeletons as Deduction subjects, i.e., no concept 
was induced. Nor was a concept produced deductively by instruc­
tions. Control subjects were then exposed to the same subsequent 
sets of stimuli as all other subjects. The ambiguous (Set 2) 
stimuli constituted the test of initial concept strength and 
might be expected, in themselves, to induce a mild expectation 
for category words, since ten of ten category responses were 
possible to this set, though not probable. If this occurred for
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some subjects, subsequent response to the same discrediting and 
reinstating stimuli experienced by experimental group subjects 
would reflect the influence through category responses elevated 
above those indicated in standardization data. The control group 
made possible an evaluation of any tendency toward concept induc­
tion by the concept-strength test itself and these data are pre­
sented in connection with Hypothesis 1 results below.
A general description of experimental procedures would, then, 
be as follows: Concepts were produced inductively or deductively
in experimental groups of subjects and in two strengths within each 
of these groups (Set 1 stimuli or instructions). Concept strength 
was tested (ambiguous Set 2 stimuli); was discredited (Set 3, 4, 
and 5 stimuli); and an attempt at reinstatement of the concept con­
cluded the experimental conditions (Set 6 stimuli). Control sub­
jects experienced the same conditions as experimental subjects, 
except that ^  concept was intentionally produced inductively or 
deductively prior to test of concept strength on Set 2 stimuli.
The experimental measure employed was proportion of responses 
made to each set that were category items. For all subjects.
Set 2 stimuli constituted the test of initial concept strength. 
Presumably, the stronger the concept the higher the proportion 
of skeleton words on this ambiguous set that would be seen as 
category items. Stimulus Sets 3, 4, and 5 represented progres­
sively decreasing category response probabilities. They were
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used both to discredit or invalidate the concept and to provide 
a measure of concept strength at each point in the course of change. 
Set 6 items were ambiguous items included to provide a measure of 
the relative difficulty of reinstating the discredited concepts.
Prior to the test of initial concept strength (Set 2 stimuli), 
Induction subjects had responded to ten skeleton words (eight or 
ten of which were category items— Stimulus Sets lb and Ic, respec­
tively) . Control and Deduction subjects also responded to ten 
skeleton words prior to the test of initial concept strength— in 
these instances Stimulus Set la, which was approximately equivalent 
in difficulty to sets lb and Ic. All subjects were, then, tested 
for initial concept strength after responding to the same number 
of skeleton word stimuli.
As an additional check on correspondence of deductive and in­
ductive procedures, a small independent group of 42 subjects was 
exposed to All (16 subjects) and Most (26 subjects) expectation- 
producing conditions. Induction procedure only. It had been de­
sired to approximate inductively the effects of deduction (given 
in instructions) of the form "All Xs are Ys" and "Most Xs are Ys." 
Response to the ambiguous test stimuli (Set 2) by pretest subjects 
indicated this might be roughly accomplished by "forced response 
to ten of ten and eight of ten instances, respectively, in which 
Xs (skeleton words) were Ys (category items). No doubt, 80 of 100 
and 100 of 100 would be preferable, but practical time considerations
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and boredom effects limited the number of induction items that 
could be employed.
The 42 subjects referred to above were asked to complete the 
skeleton words on Set la or Set lb and to write answers sequentially 
to the following questions: What class or kind of words were on
the sheet? What percentage of them were of this kind? What percen­
tage of them had to do with food and eating? Choose one of the fol­
lowing words to describe the proportion of them having to do with 
food and eating: All, Most, About Half, Few, None.
Of the 16 subjects exposed to ten category items, all comple­
ted ten. Five subjects volunteered a category label equivalent to 
that used in instructions to Deduction subjects, , "foods or
connected with such," "food and where it is prepared," "words having 
to do with things in the kitchen." Eleven subjects volunteered 
"food" as a category, possibly indicating use of a narrower cate­
gory than was desired. However, it may be that the label was narrow 
but the actual category used was not, since three of the eleven esti­
mated that 100 percent were "food" words, apparently including "kit­
chen" and "kettle" in the category as foods.
For those subjects exposed to the All-Induction conditions, 
the mean estimate of items falling in the category they had sup­
plied was 84 percent, indicating some use of the narrower "food" 
category. The mean estimate of items falling in a "food and eating" 
category was 96 percent. Of the 16 subjects, 13 chose "All" as
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describing the proportion of items having to do with "food and 
eating," while two chose "Most," and one chose "About Half."
Of the 26 subjects exposed to the Most-Induction conditions—  
eight category and two noncategory items— ten subjects supplied 
categories essentially equivalent to "having to do with food and 
eating," and 16 listed "food" as the category. Their mean esti­
mate of the items fitting the category they had supplied was 61 
percent. The mean estimate of items fitting the "food and eating" 
category was 79 percent, and 24 of the 26 chose "Most" as descrip­
tive of the proportion of such items, with one subject choosing 
"All" and one choosing "About Half."
The approximation of All and Most expectations for category 
items produced by these experimental procedures was then quite 
good when subjects used the intended category. However, some of 
these subjects used a probably narrower "food" category, resulting 
in a depression of the level of expectation below that desired.
It would have been desirable to use "food" items exclusively had 
enough been available. Postman and Crutchfield (1952) were unable 
to locate enough items for their experiment in the narrower "food" 
category, and even the extensive additions to their items in the 
present standardization failed to supply enough items for this 
desirable restriction.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Subject responses were scored as category, noncategory, and 
nonresponse (including nonword responses). Records of the control 
group subjects and the various experimental group subjects were 
separated, and the responses were tabulated for each of the six 
sets of ten stimuli. Frequency distributions of these raw scores 
are presented in Appendix D.
It was desired to construct a figure for visual presentation 
of the pattern or course of concept change. This could be done 
in at least two different ways. On the one hand, proportion or 
percentage of possible responses that were category responses 
might be taken as a measure of the concept. The number of cate­
gory responses made per set would amount to the same thing, since 
stimuli per set was always ten. On the other hand, proportion of 
responses actually made which were category responses might be 
taken as the measure, and this latter measure seems preferable 
for the following reason: Nonresponse is a confounded measure
including effects of both (a) lower vocabulary, spelling ability, 
motivation, cooperation, etc. (associated with individuals), and
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(b) any inhibitory effects of strong expectations on incompatible 
responses— here, noncategory words (associated with experimental 
groups).
Choice of the proportion of responses actually made that were 
category responses provides a statistical control for this con­
founded factor. This experimental measure was derived from the 
raw data in Appendix D for each stimulus set responded to by each 
subject, and frequency distributions of these data are presented 
in Appendix E. From these data were constructed the plots of 
concept change presented in Fig. 1.
Systematic differences in nonresponse (including nonword res- 
ponses) associated with experimental conditions are dealt with be­
low in connection with particular hypotheses. Experimental measures 
were utilized which are appropriate to an attempt to separate ef­
fects of concepts (expectations) on response suppression and per­
ceptual selectivity.
Statistical tests by analysis of variance appear most appro­
priate to these data and hypotheses. However, the nature of these 
data (proportions) and the experimental procedures (tending to 
produce bimodality only under certain of the experimental condi­
tions) raise doubts as to whether the parametric analysis of 
variance can be utilized on untransformed scores. Inspection of 
both raw and derived data in Appendixes D and E indicates probable 
violation of assumptions of normal distribution and homogeneity
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of variance. Since it seemed desirable to use tests of comparable 
power or efficiency throughout the analysis of these data, at this 
point a decision was made among alternatives of consistently ana­
lyzing untransformed data or transformed data with parametric 
techniques or of resorting to nonparametric or distribution-free 
tests.
Variances were computed from experimental measures of the 
various subgroups, and the Hartley test and Bartlett test for 
homogeneity of variance (Walker & Lev, 1953, pp. 191-194) were 
performed. Both tests indicated significant heterogeneity of 
variance. Therefore, data were transformed using transformations 
recommended (Walker & Lev, 1953, pp. 423-424) for normalizing dis­
tributions of proportions. The same tests again indicated signifi­
cant heterogeneity of variance, and bimodality of some distributions 
remained.
The decision was therefore made to utilize nonparametric tests 
of the "median test" or "ranked data" kinds throughout the analyses.
Hypothesis JL
Data from all subjects were used in tests of this hypothesis. 
Since the prediction was greater initial concept strength resulting 
from Deduction than from Induction procedure, the relevant data 
were category response proportions to the Set 2 stimuli immediately 
following concept production. It should be noted, again, that the 
prediction was limited to the conditions of the present experiment
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and that it obviously cannot be argued from positive findings that 
all deductively-derived concepts are stronger than all inductively- 
derived concepts.
An extension of the "median test" was employed as described 
by Wilson (1956):
Rao has shown that a chi-square statistic for a 
contingency table can be decomposed into components 
in much the same manner as a total sum-of-squares is 
decomposed in analysis of variance computations. By 
making a relatively simple modification of Rao's tech­
nique, it is possible to use this type of analysis in 
making a distribution-free (i,.e., nonparametric) test 
of the hypotheses concerning main effects and inter­
action ordinarily tested by a two-way (or two factor) 
analysis of variance (Wilson, 1956, p. 96) .
The value which exactly dichotomizes the combined scores of 
all the experimental subjects (Set 2 stimuli) was .85. Scores from 
the 280 experimental subjects were employed in this test--14G of 
which fell at or above .86, and 140 of which fell at or below .83. 
Scores (category response proportions) were separated at the common 
median for each experimental subgroup— n = 90 in each Induction 
group and n = 50 in each Deduction group. The resulting frequen­
cies are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
By Wilson's (1956) formulas, chi-square for total was 60.40. 
Chi-square for Production Method was 29.90 (P<.001) and chi-square 
for Strength was 0.24 (P >.70). Chi-square associated with inter­
action of Production Method and Strength variables, by subtraction, 
was 30,26 (P < .001). All chi-squares had one degree of freedom.
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Table 5
Contingency Table for Experimental Groups, Category 
Response Proportions above the Common Median 
on Ambiguous Test Stimuli (Set 2)
Strength
Production Method
Totals
Deduction Induction
All 40 32 72
Most 41 27 68
Totals 81 59 140
Table 6
Contingency Table for Experimental Groups, Category 
Response Proportions below the Common Median 
on Ambiguous Test Stimuli (Set 2)
Strength
Production Method
Totals
Deduction Induction
All 10 58 68
Most 9 63 72
Totals 19 121 140
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Hypothesis 1, then, receives support at P <.0001. The Deduc­
tion procedure resulted in stronger concepts, as measured by res­
ponses to ambiguous test stimuli, than did the Induction procedure. 
The mean response proportions associated with this significant dif­
ference were .899 for Deduction subjects and .699 for Induction 
subjects. See Table 7 for mean category response proportions of 
experimental groups.
Table 7
Mean Category Response Proportions for Experimental 
Groups on Ambiguous Test Stimuli (Set 2)
Production Method
TotalsDkrengcn
Deduction Induction
All .897 .737 .794
Most .905 .662 . .747
Means .899 .699 .770
^For comparison, the mean category response proportion for 
control group subjects on Set 2 stimuli was .500.
The Strength variable was not significant; the All procedure 
did not produce consistently stronger concepts than the Most pro­
cedure. The effect was, however, in the expected direction--the
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mean response proportions being for All-subjects, .794, and for 
Most-subjects, .747. The significant interaction sppeared to in­
volve mainly the exceptionally high mean response score of Deduc­
tion-Most subjects which is discussed below.
Since experimental procedures were intended to produce two 
initial response levels— All and Most expectations— additional 
tests were desirable to determine whether Deduction procedures 
resulted in significantly higher response proportions than Induc­
tion procedures, at epch level. The significance of the Strength 
variable could have been accounted for by a highly significant 
difference at only the All, or only the Most, level.
The median test for two groups (Edwards, 1954, pp. 387-390) 
was employed for this purpose. Deduction-All subjects exhibited 
significantly stronger concepts initially than Induction-All 
subjects— Chi-square = 23.67, with one degree of freedom, P < .001. 
Also, Deduction-Most subjects exhibited significantly stronger con­
cepts initially than Induction-Most subjects— Chi-square = 32.74, 
with one degree of freedom, P < .001. Hypothesis 1, then, received 
full support.
It was expected that Induction subjects would frequently fail 
to reach the intended level of expectation, and a larger number of 
these were included in the sample, so as to provide a statistically 
adequate number that did reach the intended level. It was also
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expected that some few subjects exposed to Most procedures would 
adopt the "gambling orientation" reported by Bruner, Goodnow, and 
Âustin(1956, i,.£., would expect all, rather than most, items to 
be category items. That a surprisingly large number did so under 
Deduction-Most conditions (actually, 26 of 50) is attested by the 
significant interaction, and by the high response proportion (.900) 
under these conditions. The all expectation was also seen under 
Induction-Most conditions (13 of 90 subjects) but in smaller degree.
Before proceeding to analysis of data in connection with the 
other hypotheses, two questions remain to be explored: (1) Did
Control subjects develop an expectation for category items as a 
consequence of the test of initial concept strength? (2) Did 
experimental subjects develop a stronger concept than Control sub­
jects?
The Control subject data presented in Fig. 1 are proportions 
of responses made which were category responses on each stimulus 
set. Comparable standardization subject data are not available 
since stimuli were not combined in sets of ten in the standard­
ization procedure. Therefore, the Control subject data comparable 
with standardized response probabilities (Table 2) is percentage 
of possible responses which were category items. These are pre­
sented below in Table 8 with associated response possibilities.
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Table 8
Category Response Proportions Compared for 
Stimulus Sets 2 through 6; Possible, 
Probable, and Achieved
Stimulus
Set
Possible
Probable
(Standardization)
Achieved 
(Control Group)
2 1.00 .36 .40
3 1.00 .13 .15
4 .50 .02 .04
5 .00 .00 .00
6 1.00 .43 .51
Although category response percentages are higher for Control 
than Standardization subjects on Stimulus Sets 2, 3, and 4, they 
are only slightly so. Since stimulus presentations were not com­
parable for these groups of subjects, no statistical test of the
difference is reasonable. However, it should be mentioned that 
noncategory response proportions for Control subjects (39%) were 
also higher than those for Standardization subjects (37%) on Set 
2 stimvili.
It may be that response percentages for both category and 
non category items were increased for Control subjects by virtue 
of greater alertness. They responded to fewer stimuli than Stan­
dardization subjects. However, since response percentages of
Control subjects were also higher on Stimulus Sets 3, 4, and 6, it
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would appear that some mild degree of expectation for category 
items may have been induced by the Set 2 stimuli which constituted 
the initial test of concept strength.
Finally, to test whether Experimental subjects developed a 
stronger expectation for category items than Control subjects, 
a median test for two groups was performed (Edwards, 1954, pp. 387- 
390) on Set 2 category response proportions of these groups of 
subjects. Chi-square was 24.87 which, with one degree of freedom, 
is associated with P < .001, which supports the view that Experi­
mental subjects developed stronger concepts than Control subjects 
as a consequence of the concept-formation procedures to which they 
were exposed.
Table 9 summarizes the statistical comparisons made in con­
nection with tests of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis .2
Following the test of initial concept strength using Set 2 
stimuli, all subjects experienced identical stimulus conditions 
designed to discredit or invalidate the experimentally-produced 
concepts. Subjects responded sequentially to Stimulus Sets 3,
4, and 5, each set having a decreasing probability of category 
response. Furthermore, no more than 50 percent category respon­
ses were possible to Set 4, and no category responses were pos­
sible to Set 5. See Tables 2, 3, and 8 for specification of
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Table 9
Summary of the Results of Median Tests Performed 
in Connection with Hypothesis 1
Variables Chi-Square
Degrees of 
Freedom Probability
Total* 60.40 1 -
Production Methods* 29.90 1 < .001
Strength* 0.24 1 > .70
Interaction* 30.26 1 < .001
Deduction-All vs 
Induction-All 23.67 1 < .001
Deduction-Most vs 
Indue tlon-Mos t^ 32.74 1 < .001
Control Group vs
Experimental Groups^ 24.87 1 < .001
^Wilson's (1956) median test of analysis of variance hypotheses. 
^Two-group median test (Edwards, 1954, pp. 387-390).
experimental conditions Imposed.
Subject responses to these stimulus conditions can be seen In 
Appendix E and In Fig, 1, The dwindling probability and possi­
bility of category response Is reflected In decreasing category 
responses and Increasing noncategory responses made by Control
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Group subjects and subjects of all Experimental Groups. Experi­
mental Group subjects had been led, in one way or another, to ex­
pect category items "on each sheet." No Experimental subject 
made any category responses to Set 5 stimuli, and each Experimen­
tal subject made some noncategory responses to Set 5 stimuli (see 
Appendix E). Since this pattern of response is incompatible with 
the continuing expectation for all, most, or even some category 
items on each sheet, it can be assumed that the experimentally- 
produced concepts had been discredited or invalidated at this 
point in the experiment. Hypothesis 2, therefore, appears tenable 
in view of these data.
Stimulus Sets 3, 4 and 5 served the dual purpose of dis­
crediting expectations for category items and providing a step- 
by-step measure of concept strength during the course of the change, 
It was shown in connection with Hypothesis 1 that Experimental 
subjects developed a stronger concept initially than Control sub­
jects. It would seem reasonable to expect, then, that this signi­
ficant difference might continue on Set 3 but might well decrease 
or disappear on Set 4, that is, before such a difference became an 
impossibility on Set 5.
Median tests for two groups were performed on category res­
ponse proportions of Experimental vs Control Groups, separately, 
for Stimulus Sets 3 and 4, and these results are summarized in 
Table 10 in conjunction with results of a similar test on Set 2 
stimuli performed in connection with Hypothesis 1.
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Table 10
Summary of Median Tests Performed in 
Connection with Hypothesis 2
Experimental Group 
vs Control Group
Chi-Square
Degrees of 
Freedom Probability
Set 2 24.87 1 < .001
Set 3 36.91 1 < .001
Set 4 0.03 1 > .75
Set 5 0 1 -
With a possibility of half the items on Set 4 eliciting cate­
gory responses, a significant difference between responses of 
Control and Experimental subjects clearly could have occurred.
That it did not do so is supportive of the view that Experimental 
subjects had stronger concepts than Control subjects through Sets 
2 and 3, but that it had been discredited by Set 4, that is, even 
prior to Stimulus Set 5.
Hypothesis 2
The prediction was that when initial concept strength was 
equated, deductively-derived concepts would be more rigidly held 
than would inductively-derived concepts, i^ .^., would be associated 
with a different specified pattern of change under pressure to 
change. The pattern of change proposed as defining rigidity was
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initially greater resistance to change followed by more sudden 
change. It was also expected, of course, that stronger concepts 
would be held more rigidly than weaker concepts.
It was necessary to equate initial strength of concepts 
(expectations) in order to demonstrate that strength, at least 
as usually measured, does not offer a fully adequate explanation 
for behavioral rigidity. Even when initial concept strength was 
the same, it was predicted that deductively-formed concepts would 
be held more rigidly than inductively-formed concepts.
The experimental measure for purposes of testing this hypo­
thesis was proportion of responses made that were category 
responses on each of Stimulus Sets 2, 3, and 4. Category res­
ponse proportions to Set 2 stimuli (the test of initial concept 
strength) were used to equate initial concept strength at All and 
Most levels for Deduction and Induction subjects. That is, sub­
groups of Experimental subjects were selected from those presented 
in Appendix E so as to meet criteria for method of formation and 
initial strength of concept. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested only 
in connection with data from these groups, hereafter referred to 
as criterion subgroups.
The criterion for an "All" initial expectation was a 100 per­
cent category response proportion on Set 2 stimuli. The criter­
ion for a "Most" expectation was a less than 100 percent but more 
than 75 percent category response proportion on Set 2 stimuli.
This latter criterion was chosen to approximate the use of "most"
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made by pretest subjects on which data are presented at the end 
of the section on procedure.
Composition of criterion subgroups, in preference to a 
subject-by-subject matching procedure, necessitated the use of 
independent sample statistics rather than matched sample statis­
tics. The Deduction and Inductive criterion subgroups are, then, 
comparable in initial concept strength, separately, at All and 
Most levels. Control subjects are the total sample of such sub­
jects also employed in tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Data on these criterion subgroups of experimental subjects 
were extracted from Appendix E, and the mean category response 
proportions are presented in Table 11. Mean category response 
proportions on Set 5 stimuli were zero for all groups. Data on 
Set 6 stimuli are employed in connection with Hypothesis 4 below. 
Fig. 2 was constructed on the basis of these mean category res­
ponse proportions.
Although assumptions of parametric analysis of variance were 
not met by these data, some statistical test more sensitive to 
differences of magnitude than the "median" tests employed in Hypo­
theses 1 and 2 seemed desirable. Accordingly, "sum of ranks" tests 
(Edwards, 1954, pp. 417-430) were employed in testing the predic­
tions of Hypothesis 3.
Tp test for greater resistance early in the course of change, 
category response proportions of experimental criterion subgroups 
on Set 3 stimuli were compared. It was assumed that subjects who
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Table 11
Mean Category Response Proportions of Criterion 
Subgroups of Experimental Subjects and 
Control Subjects on Stimulus 
Sets 2, 3, 4, and 6
Group
Stimulus Sets
Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 6
Deduction-All 
(n = 25) 1.00 .730 .112 .688
Induction-All 
(n = 19) 1.00 .579 .079 .712
Deduction-Mos t 
(n = 19) .863 .498 .032 .704
Induction-Most 
(n = 27) .837 .483 .012 .659
Control 
(n = 40) .500 .178 .042 .569
produced higher proportions of category responses on this set were 
exhibiting a greater early resistance to recognizing that their 
expectations were inaccurate. Tests of the major variables— method 
of concept production and initial level of concept strength— were 
performed first.
Category response proportions on Set 3 stimuli were combined 
and ranked for all experimental criterion subgroup subjects. Rank 
totals were, for Deduction subjects (All and Most levels combined),
1,788.5, and for Induction subjects (All and Most levels combined).
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2,306.5. The smaller rank total Indicates greater resistance to 
change, since Rank 1 was assigned to the largest score. Mean 
category response proportions were, for Deduction subjects, 0.630, 
and for Induction subjects, 0.523. Since N was large (total N = 90), 
the recommended test by normal curve approximation was made. With 
corrections for continuity and tied ranks, computed z = 1.74, with 
associated probability .0409 by one-tailed test (since direction 
of difference was predicted).
To test for effects of the initial concept strength variable, 
rank totals were calculated: All (Deduction and Induction com­
bined), 1,653.0, Most (Deduction and Induction combined), 2,442.0. 
Mean category response proportions were, for All-group subjects,
0.665 and for Most-group subjects, 0.489. Computed £  = 2.84, is 
significant at P = .0023.
Greater resistance to early change is, then, associated with 
initially stronger concepts and concepts formed deductively. In­
spection of Table 11 reveals that on Set 3 stimuli, difference 
between category response proportions of Deduction-All and Induc­
tion-All groups was considerable, but that the difference between 
Deduction-Most and Induction-Most groups was small. To fully 
support the prediction of greater early resistance to change of 
deductively-formed concepts, the differences at both All and Most 
levels of initial concept strength had to be significant.
"Sum of ranks" tests were again employed in this test. The 
rank difference between Deduction-All and Induction-All subjects
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was associated with a = 1.422, P = .0778, approaching significance. 
The rank difference between Deduction-Most and Induction-Most sub­
jects was associated with z < 1— clearly not significant. Hypo­
thesis 3 thus fails to receive full support in this instance.
Inspection of Fig. 2 reveals that Deduction-All subjects were 
outstanding in resistance to change on Set 3 stimuli as compared 
with other experimental group subjects. As a test of whether 
Deduction-All subjects differed from all other experimental 
subjects in this respect, category response proportions for all 
subjects were combined and ranked in order to perform a "sum of 
ranks" test. The rank total for Deduction-All subjects was 800; 
for all other Experimental subjects, 3,295. Computed z = 3.037,
P = .0012, indicates that the subjects who developed absolutistic 
expectations deductively were more resistant to change early in 
the course of change than other subjects who also developed ex­
pectations for category items. Table 12 summarizes the results 
of the above statistical tests.
It might also be reasonably expected that any preconception 
or expectation, in any appreciable strength and however formed, 
would be associated with a greater resistance to change than no 
(or a very mild) expectation. Although it appeared obvious from 
an inspection of Fig. 2 that such was the case, a "median test" 
(Edwards, 1954, pp. 387-390) was performed. Chi-square was 44.24 
which is associated with P < .001 at one degree of freedom. Greater 
resistance to change was exhibited by Experimental subjects than
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Table 12
Summary of Resistance-to-Change Results on Set 3 
Stimuli by "Sum of Ranks" Tests
Variables z Probability
Deduction vs. 
Induction 1.74 .0409
All Level vs. 
Most Level 2.84 .0023
Deduction-All vs, 
Induction-All 1.422 .0778
Deduction-Most vs. 
Induction-Most < 1
Deduction-All vs. 
Other E:q>eri- 
mental Subjects 3.037 .0012
Control subjects as measured by category response proportions on 
Set 3 stimuli.
Hypothesis 3 predicted greater rigidity of deductively-formed 
concepts than inductively-formed concepts. It . also expected 
that stronger (All level) concepts would be more rigid than weaker 
(Most level) concepts. It has been shown above that the stronger 
concepts were definitely more resistant to change early in the 
course of change. The effects of deductive concept formation on
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resistance to change were barely significant and comparisons be­
tween Induction and Deduction subjects at All and Most levels of 
initial strength were not significant. The special case of deduc­
tive formation of All expectations (absolutistic concepts) was 
associated with greater resistance to change than other methods 
and initial strengths considered together. All Experimental 
subjects considered together exhibited more resistance to change 
than did Control subjects who had no (or a mild) expectation for 
category items.
However, an early or initial resistance to change was only a 
part of the proposed definition of rigidity. Hypothesis 3 also 
specified that early resistance would be followed by greater or more 
sudden change by deductively-formed concepts. It can be seen by 
inspection of Fig. 2 and Table 11 that variables associated with 
greater resistance to change on Set 3 stimuli were also automati­
cally associated with greater change between Set 3 and Set 5. This 
change was intentionally forced by the nature of the stimulus con­
ditions as specified in the experimental design in Chapter II. It 
completes the pattern of change proposed as defining rigidity-- 
greater early resistance to change followed by greater (or faster) 
change later.
In life outside the laboratory concept change is not infre­
quently forced. Reality, in highly structured stimulus situations, 
may have a compellingness which is not to be ignored. Such situa­
tions range from forced regurgitations in home and classroom.
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through "Negroes are educable," to brainwashing. It is precisely 
this forced change in concept or expectation, voluntary or not, 
which the present experiment is designed to examine. Behavioral 
rigidity under such circumstances is seen in an initial resistance 
to change followed by change which is compelled by the experienced 
stimulus situation.
It is therefore concluded, in connection with Hypothesis 3, 
that any concept (Experimental groups) was associated with greater 
rigidity than no (or a mild) concept (Control group). Stronger 
concepts (All-groups) were more rigid than milder concepts (Most- 
groups). Deductively-formed concepts were more rigid than in­
ductively-formed concepts, though not separately at All and Most 
levels of initial concept strength. Finally, the most pronounced 
rigidity was found to be associated with the special case of 
deductively-formed, absolutistic (All expectation) concepts— a 
type of concept (expectation) formation of considerable practical 
and theoretical importance.
Hypothesis 4
Inspection of Fig. 2 and Table 11 reveals that the Hypo­
thesis 4 prediction of greater ease of reinstating discredited, 
induetively^formed concepts than deductively-formed concepts is 
clearly not supported by these data. Neither does initial con­
cept strength predict ease of reinstatement of the discredited
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expectation. Nor are there indications of interaction effects. 
Although all criterion subgroups of experimental subjects exhibit 
larger mean category response proportions than the control group, 
the difference was not significant by median test (Edwards, 1954, 
pp. 387-390). Chi-square = 1.705, with one degree of freedom, is 
associated with P > .10. Hypothesis 4 is, then, clearly not sup­
ported by these data.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The results of this experiment which are to be discussed 
below may be summarized as follows. Concepts (attitudes, expec­
tations, sets, etc.) were produced experimentally in varying' 
strengths and by two procedures--deductively (by means of writ­
ten instructions) and inductively (by subject response to a 
series of stimulus items). The deductive method of concept 
formation resulted in stronger concepts than the inductive me­
thod of concept formation used in this experiment. A consider­
able number of subjects exposed to conditions intended to produce 
relativistic ("Most" expectation) concepts deductively actually 
developed absolutistic ("All" expectation) concepts. The experi­
mentally-produced concepts were discredited or invalidated by 
stimulus conditions which demonstrated with increasing certainty 
over time and inadequacy of the expectations involved.
Experimental subgroups ("criterion" groups) within these 
larger groups were composed of those subjects who actually attained 
the intended levels of concept strength ("All" and "Most" ex­
pectations) by each method of concept formation. Effects of 
initial concept strength, mode of concept formation, and their
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Interaction were assessed in connection with these subgroups 
of subjects for which initial concept strength had been equated 
at two levels. Rigidity of concept utilization, as defined by 
initially greater resistance to change followed by more rapid 
change, was found to be associated with deductive concept for­
mation, initial concept strength, and most strikingly with the 
special instance of deductive formation of the strongest concepts. 
Experimental production of concepts was associated with greater 
rigidity than the case of no (or mild) concepts of the Control 
subjects. Finally, an attempt was made to reinstate discredited 
concepts, but no differences were found in ease of reinstate­
ment between experimental groups or between experimental and 
control groups.
A finding in this experiment which deserves careful qualifi­
cation in discussion was the greater strength, under these particu­
lar stimulus conditions, of deductively-formed concepts as compared 
with inductively-formed concepts. In a number of other experiments, 
under other particular stimulus conditions, the strength of deduc­
tively formed concepts has also been revealed (Henle, 1942; Hill, 
1953; Postman & Leytham, 1951; Vinacke, 1952; and Walker, 1955).
The present experiment adds another bit of evidence along these 
same lines, but it cannot be concluded from any or all of these 
that a particular deductively-formed concept will necessarily be 
stronger than a particular inductively-formed concept. A fruitful
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direction that research on this topic might take would be indi­
cated in a question such as, "How much of what sort of inductive 
experience is equivalent to a particular deductive experience?"
In this connection, a theoretical issue is raised with res­
pect to the amount of "information" conveyed by inductive experi­
ence as compared with deductive experiences. One implication of 
the deductive derivation of concepts would appear to be that they 
are based on "less information" (not necessarily less accurate) 
than similar, inductively-derived concepts. For example, in 
terms of quantity of sensory energies involved, being told, "Snails 
are not good to eat," represents less "experience" than a series 
of attempts to eat snails culminating in the same, or a similar 
conception. However, "information" cannot be equated with quan­
tity of external or sensory energies because of redundancy. An 
additional experience may or may not convey appreciable "informa­
tion."
It does appear that concepts based on verbal dicta are often 
supported by less (or less certain or reliable) information about 
the referent of the concept than those learned in actual contact 
with the referent, but this need not necessarily be the case. It 
also seems likely that concepts based on less, or less certain, 
information might be held more rigidly, when held at all, than 
apparently similar concepts based on more, or better, information 
or evidence. However, until some more satisfactory way can be
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found to quantify "information received" (as contrasted with "in­
formation intended"), the question must apparently remain open.
With the summary of results and the above qualifications as 
a background, discussion will now be focused on three topics: 
rigidity as a response variable, interaction of motivational and 
conceptual factors, and the practical and research implications 
of this study.
Rigidity as a Response Variable
A distinction was proposed, in connection with the present 
experiment, between "strength" and "rigidity" of concept utiliza­
tion. It was suggested that "strength" may be a useful attribute 
at a point in time but that it is inadequate for a full under­
standing of the functional characteristics of the intervening 
variables that are variously labeled concepts, attitudes, sets, 
expectancies, hypotheses, etc. There are a great many experiments 
in the literature reporting some success in predicting subsequent 
change or resistance to change on the basis of initial "strength," 
of inferring "strength" from change or resistance to change ( e , 
Bugs, 1950; Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Harvey, Kelley, & Shapiro, 1957; 
Henle, 1942; Hill, 1953; Kelley & Volkart, 1952; Maltzmann & 
Morrisett, 1952; 1953a, 1953b; and Postman & Crutchfield, 1952). 
There are also a number of studies reporting success in predicting
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change from externally-exerted pressures to change Ewing,
1942; Goldberg, 1954; Harvey, Kelley, & Shapiro, 1957; and Hovland 
& Prltzker, 1957). Experiments have also been reported in which 
"strength" was a factor in a more complex analysis of the functional 
characteristics of the intervening variable and in which predictions 
were successfully made of change in intended directions and in the 
opposite direction (cf., Sherif & Sherif, 1956, pp. 572ff). In 
a number of theoretical views (e.£., Allport, 1955; Kelley, 1957; 
Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; and Postman, 1951), strength, intensity, 
energy— some unitary dynamic characteristic— is seen as accounting 
for change, resistance to change, or "going out of the field."
Validation of "rigidity" as an additional functional charac­
teristic of these intervening variables required, then, a demon­
stration that concepts, etc. of equal measured strength at a point 
in time might change differently under pressure to change. It 
was suggested that this possibility might have been overlooked as 
a consequence of the customary use of (usually two) point-in-time 
measures from which the unitary dynamic factor was inferred, and 
that if changes were examined over time, the necessity of bringing 
an additional variable into the analysis would be revealed.
The present experiment was therefore designed to approxi­
mate the circumstance where various persons holding apparently the 
same concept in apparently the same strength change in equal
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amounts, but change in different ways. "Rigidity" was chosen as 
a label for the pattern of change in which initial resistances 
collapse under pressure because this is what we seem to mean by 
"rigidity" in everyday life. We think of a rigid concept, atti­
tude, or expectation as one which appears strong, but is really 
brittle, fragile, inflexible, vulnerable. "Strength" seems more 
to imply flexibility or invulnerability. If rigidity is coexis­
tent with strength and confounded with it in point-in-time mea­
sures, then some of the inconsistencies in "change" and "re­
sistance" experiments may become understandable.
It was proposed in this experiment that one variable—  
probably only one of many— associated with rigid utilisation of 
concepts might be the mode or manner of formation of the concept. 
One obvious difference between methods of concept formation is 
between inductive and deductive processes, and it was this dif­
ference that was chosen for a first attempt at operational separa­
tion of "strength" and "rigidity." It was not expected, under 
these stimulus conditions and at this low level of ego-involvement 
in an inconsequential task, that an actual collapse or sharp 
break would be seen following initial resistance but merely that 
significant trends in that direction might be demonstrated. The 
findings do indicate clearly that mode of formation interacts with 
strength to produce a rigidity which is not predictable from 
strength alone. This result opens the way to further research
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exploring rigidity as a factor at least partially separable from 
strength and bringing in other variables thought to influence 
rigidity into the analysis.
It can, of course, be argued that the simple point-in-time 
measure used here (and elsewhere) is not an adequate measure of 
strength, that strength is more complicated, or that there are 
different kinds of strength. But if the complexities or kinds 
of strength involve rigidity and flexibility, then the distinction 
is essentially the one proposed above. An advantage of the defi­
nition of rigidity proposed here is that, by its use, intrusion of 
value judgments may be avoided. By this definition, a rigidly 
behaving person is not just the one who stubbornly refuses to "see 
the light," to solve a problem the way t o think he should, or to 
quit disliking members of some human group or groups. He is a 
person whose initial over-resistance to change is followed by 
rapid change.
In Chapter I, the controversy raging between proponents of 
varying explanations of rigidity was mentioned. An attempt has 
been made, in this study, to avoid the controversy, but the im­
plications of the present experiment should be clear. Although 
this was a study of behavioral rigidity, it should not be seen 
as negating intrapersonal consistencies that are demonstrable
Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956: Luchins, 1947). For ex­
ample, a "rigid personality" might be partially conceived in terms
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of these findings as one consistently associated with the deduc­
tive derivation of absolutistic conceptions. Further research 
along these lines might fill in more of the picture in a more
promising way than have speculations about authoritarian fathers
and toilet training.
Interaction of Motivation and 
Conceptual Functioning
From the results of this experiment it can also be concluded 
that the history of concept formation contributes not only to the 
content or cognitive characteristics of the concept (here, having 
to do with category items) but also to its dynamic or motivational 
characteristics (here, strength and rigidity of expectation). An 
ahistorical approach might detect a great deal about content and 
strength but overlook rigidity which was a consequence of the man­
ner in which the concept was formed.
The interaction of these cognitive and motivational components 
or aspects of the intervening variables labeled concepts, attitudes, 
expectations, beliefs, sets, etc. is also revealed by these find­
ings. Convenient continua, scales, dimensions are used in experi­
ments to measure or express strength (or other motivational variables), 
and sometimes subjects of experiments also appear to use such con­
tinuously variable scales. But frequently, with hinnan subjects, 
the logical structure or conceptual nature of the expectation.
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motive, or attitude seems to make a difference in the motivational 
or dynamic characteristics themselves. It may be that a funda­
mental discontinuity or stepwise patterning is introduced into 
human motivational processes by conceptual functioning.
It was to examine this possibility that "All" and "Most" 
strengths were introduced in instructions and approximated in 
inductive experiences provided, rather than just any two differ­
entiable strengths. It frequently seems to make a considerable 
difference whether a person believes "All Xs are Ys" or just 
"Most Xs are Ys"— to make a difference in his motivations, ex­
pectations, and behavior which is not understandable in terms 
of the possibly small quantitative difference between, for ex­
ample, believing that all men have souls and that most men have 
souls. An exceptionless finality often seems to be associated 
with absolutistic conceptions, whereas relativistic conceptions 
which differ only slightly in magnitude on a continuous scale 
seem often to differ a great deal in the motivated behavior to 
which they lead.
This experiment was purposely designed to avoid forcing sub­
jects who formed their concepts inductively to crystallize those 
concepts in a rule or principle, jL.e^ ., to avoid forcing them to 
give themselves a dictum or to formalize their induction. An 
interesting topic for future research is whether it is only ar­
riving at an absolutistic conception deductively that is associated
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with rigidity or whether giving oneself dicta, formalizing one's 
own inductions, will also be found to be associated with rigidity. 
If the latter should be the case, the conceptual nature of the 
intervening variable will be even more strongly implicated in its 
motivational characteristics.
Some Practical and Research Implications
A possible implication of the present findings has to do with 
differential recommendations that can be made for producing changes 
in concepts, expectations, attitudes, etc. when rigidity as well 
as strength is known. It is frequently recommended that change can 
best be accomplished by what may be called successive assimilation-- 
by starting with the person "where he is" and leading him gradually 
in steps acceptable to him toward some different conception. This 
procedure certainly has practical merit in many situations, but 
if it is known, for example, that the concepts to be changed are 
characterized by rigidity of the sort revealed in this experiment—  
particularly with strong conceptions given by dictum--then a recom­
mendation of more drastic measures may be in order.
That is to say, if the risk of contrast effects and "going 
out of the field" is acceptable, it may be possible to produce a 
given change in rigid concepts by "prolonged pounding" as well as 
"easy steps." If the view to be changed is absolutistic, and if 
it could, for example, have been learned only by dictum since
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there is no evidence on the topic "in this world," then the con­
ception may be a great deal more vulnerable, by virtue of its 
rigidity, than it would appear to be as measured for strength 
at any particular point in time. The consequences of producing 
large contrast effects or having large numbers of people "go out 
of the field," particularly in an educational setting, should 
not, of course, be minimized.
To conclude this discussion, some possibly fruitful research 
extensions of these findings are summarized. As mentioned above, 
it would be interesting to explore the amount of inductive experi­
ence necessary to equal a particular deductive conclusion in 
"information received" and motivational consequences. It would 
also appear promising, in exploration of rigidity as separable 
from strength, to bring different degrees of ego-involvement into 
the analysis and to assess the contribution of uncertainty, inse­
curity, or lack of stable anchorages on rigidity of conbept utili­
zation. The "disillusionment" effects predicted by Hypothesis 4, 
but not found in this experiment, might conceivably appear at 
higher levels of ego-involvement. Somewhat on a tangent, but cer­
tainly implied by these findings, would be a search for other 
motivational discontinuities or step-functions associated with 
alternative conceptual structurings.
One particular research problem would appear to be espec­
ially amenable to exploration by use of stimulus materials and
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procedures similar to those used heye. Deductively-formed, ab­
solutistic concepts were found to be particularly rigid in this 
experiment. Will erroneously absolutistic inductions that are 
not formalized by subjects prove to be rigid? If subjects are 
forced to crystallize or formalize their inductions— to give 
themselves a dictum--will rigidity result?
Finally, some broad problem areas in psychology for which the 
results of this experiment may have some implications might be 
mentioned. Is the finding that deductively-formed, absolutistic 
concepts are particularly rigid related in any way to the view 
that directive psychotherapy (deductive?) produces results that 
are less long-lasting, more vulnerable, than those of nondirective 
(inductive?) psychotherapy? Is the view that "better" learning 
is produced by "doing" (inductive) than by "telling" (deductive) 
related to a greater rigidity of the latter? Are areas of culture 
that are more resistant to change consistently associated with de­
ductive learning and absolutistic conceptions? These questions 
deserve exploration with respect to the contribution of inductive 
and deductive processes and absolutistic and relativistic concepts.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Experimental findings and theoretical views on topics of 
inductive and deductive concept formation and on strength and 
rigidity of concept utilization were surveyed and summarized.
For purposes of converting relevant data into a common termin­
ology, "concept" was used as a generic category of which set, 
attitude, expectancy, hypothesis, directive state, etc. were taken 
to be special cases. "Inductive concept formation" was used to 
refer to instances of direct, step-by-step, sequential experience 
with the referent of the concept. "Deductive concept formation" 
was used to refer to learning by dictum, formula, or instructions, 
and without direct contact with the referent of the concept.
On the basis of this survey of available data several pro­
positions appeared to be worthy of experimental exploration. It 
appeared that strength and rigidity might be separable functional 
characteristics or process aspects of concepts. It appeared, too, 
that rigidity might have been overlooked as a consequence of the 
consistent use of (usually two) point-in-time measures of strength 
in studies of concept change and resistance to change. Grounds
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were also found for predicting that deductive concept formation 
might be more closely associated with rigidity of concept utili­
zation than Inductive concept formation. Rigidity of concept 
utilization was defined as Initial resistance to change of ex­
pectations associated with the concept followed by sudden or rapid 
change,
The general pattern of the experimental design was, then, to 
produce concepts (expectations that subsequent stimuli would be 
members of a particular category) deductively (through Instruc­
tions) and Inductively (through subject responses to category 
Items). Concepts were produced In two Initial strengths— "All" 
and "Most" expectations by each method. The resulting concepts 
were tested for Initial strength and were then Invalidated or 
discredited by stimulus conditions designed to demonstrate the In­
adequacy of the concept with increasing certainty. The resulting 
pattern of change was examined for rigidity of concept utilization. 
The experimental conditions concluded with an attempt to reinstate 
the discredited concept--to detect any disillusionment effects.
The hypotheses formulated for testing were as follows:
1. Under the experimental conditions of this study, deduc­
tively-derived concepts are stronger than Inductively-derived 
concepts.
2. Concepts change— are discredited— under the specified 
stimulus conditions, regardless of Initial strength or method
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of production.
3. Deductively-derived concepts are more rigid or Inflexible 
under pressure-to-change than Induetlvely-derlved concepts of 
equal Initial strength.
4. Deductively-derived concepts, when discredited, are more 
difficult to reinstate than Inductlvely-derlved concepts.
Experimental stimuli responded to by subjects were "skele­
ton words," i,.e., words with some letters missing. The experi­
mental task was filling In missing letters to make words of the 
"skeletons." The class or category of words for which positive 
expectations were produced was "food and food-related words." 
Probabilities of category response, noncategory response, and 
estimates of difficulty were established for a large sample of 
stimuli by submitting them to a sample of 370 "standardization" 
subjects. From these available standardized stimuli were com­
posed lists of ten stimuli to meet the requirements for the ex­
perimental design. Experimental subjects were 320 Freshman 
students enrolled In English courses at Texas College of Arts 
and Industries.
Subjects forming concepts Inductively responded Initially 
to ten of ten (Intended "All" level of expectation) or eight of 
ten (Intended "Most" level of expectation) category stimuli. Sub­
jects forming concepts deductively responded Initially to ten 
"practice" noncategory stimuli, and then were Instructed, "ALL
86
(or MOST) of the words on this sheet and on the sheets to follow 
have to do with FOOD and EATING." Control subjects responded to 
the same set of ten "practice" noncategory stimuli but were not 
instructed as to what to expect prior to test of initial concept 
strength.
The test of initial concept strength was composed of the 
same ten ambiguous stimuli for all subjects— skeleton words that 
could be completed as category or noncategory items with approxi­
mately equal ease. Following this test series, three further 
sets of ten stimuli were presented to all subjects. These stimu­
lus sets had decreasing standardized probabilities and possibil­
ities of category response and were designed to discredit or 
invalidate subjects' concepts (expectations), however formed and 
in whatever initial strength. A set of ten ambiguous stimuli 
aimed at determining the relative ease of reinstating the various 
discredited concepts concluded the experimental conditions. The 
experimental measure derived from responses of each subject was, 
for each set of ten stimuli, the proportion of responses made that 
were category responses.
Experimental results fully supported Hypothesis 1, adequately 
supported Hypothesis 2, partially supported Hypothesis 3, and 
completely failed to support Hypothesis 4.
The following statements can be made at statistically respect­
able levels of confidence. The procedure used in this experiment
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to develop concepts deductively resulted in stronger concepts than 
did the inductive procedure. Subjects in all experimental groups 
developed stronger concepts than did subjects in the control group. 
Procedures which were intended to produce concepts in two strengths 
actually produced such varied concepts that initial strength did 
not differ significantly between "All” and "Most" groups. This 
finding supported the anticipated necessity of composing "criterion" 
subgroups for use in testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, i,.e., selection 
of subjects who, by each concept-production procedure, actually 
arrived at the two intended levels of concept strength. It was 
also noticed, in connection with examination of Hypothesis 1 data, 
that a surprisingly large number of subjects who formed concepts 
deductively on the basis of "Most" instructions formed absolutistic 
("All" expectation) concepts.
Concepts formed inductively and deductively and in varying 
strengths were invalidated or discredited, not by telling subjects 
the expectation was wrong, but rather by subjects responding se­
quentially to stimulus conditions which demonstrated with increasing 
certainty the inadequacy of the experimentally-produced concept. 
Findings were positive with respect to Hypothesis 2, indicating 
that experimental subjects, as compared with control subjects, 
exhibited the intended concepts in their responses initially and 
during the early phases of concept change. However, late in the 
course of change, resppnses of experimental and control subjects
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did not differ significantly— could not, as a matter of fact, by 
virtue of the nature of the experimental conditions.
Hypothesis 3 involved tests for rigidity of concept utili­
zation and required that the pattern of concept change be examined 
longitudinally for concepts of initially equal measured strength, 
formed inductively and deductively and at two initial levels of 
strength. Experimental subjects exhibited greater rigidity than 
did subjects in the control group. The prediction that deduc­
tively-derived concepts would be more rigidly utilized than in­
ductively-formed concepts received only marginal support. The 
expectation based on research summarized in Chapter I — that 
stronger concepts would be held more rigidly— received full 
support. The experimental group of subjects exhibiting rigidity 
of concept utilization most strikingly were those who had formed 
absolutistic ("All" expectation) concepts deductively.
The greater ease of reinstating inductively-formed concepts 
predicted by Hypothesis 4 ("disillusionment" effects associated 
with discredited, deductively-formed concepts) was not revealed 
by these data. Neither did initial concept strength effect ease 
of reinstating discredited concepts.
Results of theoretical significance were found in connection 
with tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3. The strength of concepts ach­
ievable through deductive procedures was again demonstrated, and 
a method for comparing deductive and inductive resultants was
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suggested by these findings. Rigidity, as a characteristic of the 
pattern of change, 'uias shown to be analytically separable from 
strength, as measured at particular points in time. Finally, ri­
gidity was found to be mildly associated with deductively-formed 
concepts and pronouncedly associated with deductive formation of 
absolutistic conceptions.
These experimental results were discussed in connection with 
other experimental data and with respect to their implications for 
theoretical views on inductive and deductive concept formation and 
strength and rigidity as separable factors. Implications were also 
explored in connection with interaction of cognitive and motiva­
tional factors. Some possible practical consequences of the find­
ings were tentatively suggested, and fruitful directions for 
subsequent research were outlined.
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APPENDIX A
Standardization and Test Data on Skeleton Words 
Constructed for this Study*
Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
P Non- 
Response
P
aspara_u_ .82 .00 .04 .000 > .20
_a_t .12 .53 .25 1.495 .07
___ar .12 .71 .12 1.339 .09
b_ _t .19 .72 .07 .855 .20
br_n_h .14 .70 .12 < .250 > .20
be_a_ .38 .36 .20 1.194 .12
b_r_y .49 .12 .27 3.157 < .001
cr_cke_ .38 .41 .11 1.374 .08
ca___age .79 .15 .04 .000 > .20
CO___ee .76 .02 .14 2.530 .006
c_r_ .08 .79 .07 .957 .17
cel_ .86 .00 .10 1.814 .04
chi___en .73 .00 .11 < .250 > .20
_e_ch .11 .64 .23 1.104 .14
end_v__ .37 .00 .58 < .250 > .20
grape___uit .94 .00 .06 < .250 > .20
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
P Non- 
Response
P
gr_P_ .49 .49 .02 .916 .17
_ey .76 .01 .17 . <.250 > .20
_lnejpple .95 .00 .04 1.070 .14
_lr_aln .63 .00 .32 1.368 .09
_ln_ .07 .74 .14 .567 > .20
ket_l_ .99 .00 .01 .000 > .20
ki_ch_n 1.00 .00 .00 .000 > .20
li_bur_er .76 .00 .20 < .250 > .20
I_m_n .78 ■ .07 .10 < .250 > .20
le___uce .96 .00 .01 < .250 > .20
mu_ _on .67 .00 .25 < .250 > .20
m_st__rd .91 .00 .05 .890 .19
_nio_ .57 .05 .34 < .250 > .20
_ob_ter .72 .08 .18 1.078 .14
P_ .24 .67 .03 .627 > .20
p_es_rves .97 .00 .02 .748 > .20
P_a_ .27 .46 .20 >3.000 < .001
P__r .22 .76 .01 1.661 .05
P_r_ .01 .79 .13 .000 > .20
pot_t_ .80 .00 .16 < .250 > .20
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
P Non- 
Response
P
r_d^sh .74 .22 .04 .945 .17
roa___ .56 .32 .07 2.334 .01
_ra_ .07 .60 .21 .660 > .20
_riP_ .08 .64 .18 <.250 > .20
s_us jge .80 .00 .17 <.250 > .20
squ_s_ .67 .07 .16 <.250 > .20
s_il__et .68 .00 .26 1.392 .08
shr_m_ .74 .00 .19 1.828 ,04
s_l_ .11 .80 .05 .837 .20
SP_ .J- .64 .10 .12 <.250 > .20
s___w .11 .62 .22 <.250 > .20
t___ut .34 .00 .68 1.928 .03
t_mat_ .79 .00 .20 >3.000 < .001
_urnjp .88 .00 .07 <.250 > .20
_u_a .19 .21 .56 1.476 .07
Probabilities do not total 1,00. Nonword responses have 
been excluded.
Test statistics for "Comparing Two Sample Proportions" 
(Wallis & Roberts, 1956, pp. 429-431) by means of the stan­
dardized normal variable (See Chapter II).
APPENDIX B
Standardization and Test Data on Skeleton Words 
Adopted from a Previous Study
Skeleton P Food P Nonfood P Non-
Words Response Response Response
r
a_ _le .49 .46 .04 3.898 < .001
_a_on .23 .41 .22 .017 > .20
_a_e .05 .83 .10 -.237 > .20
__ak_ .34 .55 .08 .000 > .20
_a_dy .22 .61 .12 1.553 .06
_a_rot .78 .14 .08 .389 > .20
_a_ing .13 .57 .13 .062 > .20
_a_try .61 .01 .23 .104 > .20
_a_ce .07 .36 .48 1.504 .06
_ _avy .62 .18 .16 .390 > .20
___al .11 .51 .29 1.104 .14
be___ .28 .65 .07 .016 > .20
bu___er .65 .20 .10 <.250 > .20
b_e_d .36 .39 .22 .000 > .20
b_n_na .96 .00 .03 <.250 > .20
c_o_ .31 .54 .12 4.203 < .001
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
P Non- 
Response
P
ere___ .42 .38 .04 1.725 .04
c___kie .92 .00 .05 < .250 > .20
che_8_ .87 .00 .08 1.154 .12
d_s_ .21 .64 .09 2.475 .007
di___ .16 .79 .02 1.215 .12
dl___er .76 .14 .07 < .250 > .20
d_8s_rt .95 .00 .05 < .250 > .20
_e_f ,31 .52 .15 .251 > .20
_e_iy .32 .27 .30 .964 .17
___eak .42 .50 .03 2.629 .004
fi_ _ .18 .75 .02 .844 ,20
f_u__t .78 .07 .07 < .250 > .20
h_s_ .01 .80 .16 < .250 > .20
h_n_er .22 .50 .15 < .250 > .20
h_ng_r ,67 .30 .02 .562 > .20
_in_er .25 .63 .03 < .250 > .20
_ic_ .06 .76 .13 < .250 > .20
_i_k .02 .75 .14 < .250 > .20
_ic_le .31 .39 .19 .876 .19
.81 .09 .05 1 1.535 .06
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
P Non- 
Response
i...
P
lun_ __ .69 .27 .03 < .250 > .20
___lish .30 .20 .20 1.001 .16
m_a_ .19 .47 .25 < .250 > .20
me_ _ ,43 .51 .04 1.533 .06
o_8t_r .79 .03 .14 .933 .18
_o_d .07 .86 .04 < .250 > .20
_ou_ .09 .70 .18 2.033 .02
___ok .11 .79 .07 < .250 > .20
P e _ _ .03 .93 .Q2 1.126 .13
pick_ _ .49 .45 .03 1.804 .04
pa_t_jr .54 .15 .22 < .250 > .20
pe_ _er .41 .16 .17 < .250 > .20
P_J>pe_ .61 .25 .18 2.038 .02
ro_8_ .61 .18 .14 2.618 .004
8___ce .42 .34 .14 .789 > .20
8__e__k .22 .51 .18 < .250 > .20
8___ak .38 .17 .35 2.334 .01
8_ar_e .03 .40 .44 < .250 > .20
8_la_ .44 .11 .36 < .250 > .20
8al___ .48 .34 .08 < .250 > .20
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
P Non- 
Response P
___ster .12 .75 .07 < .250 >.20
t_a_t .17 .22 .50 < .250 >.20
_ut_er .67 .26 .04 < .250 >.20
_u_ar .31 .15 .43 2.368 .009
_uppe_ .73 .15 .10 < .250 >.20
ve___ .16 .80 .01 2.401 .008
v_ _1 .74 .11 .06 .814 >.20
The data presented here constitute a restandardization of 
skeleton words previously standardized by Postman & Crutchfield (1952) 
Probabilities do not total 1.00, since nonword responses have been 
excluded.
Test statistics for "Comparing Two Sample Proportions" (Wallis 
& Roberts, 1956, pp. 429-431) by means of the standardized normal 
variable (See Chapter II).
APPENDIX C
Standardized Skeleton Words from which Stimuli for This 
Study Were Selected, in Order of Decreasing 
Probability of Category (Food) Response
Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
Ambiguity* Difficulty^
ki_ch_n 1.00 .00 1.00 .00
ket_l_ .99 .00 1.00 .01
p_es_rves .97 .00 1.00 .02
le_ _uce .96 .00 1.00 .01
b_n_na .96 .00 1.00 .03
d__ss_rt .95 .00 1.00 .05
grape___uit .94 .00 1.00 .06
C  _kie .92 .00 1.00 .05
_urn_p .88 .00 1.00 .07
aspara_u_ .82 .00 1.00 .04
pot_t_ .80 .00 1.00 .16
8_u8jge .80 .00 1.00 .17
ca_ _age .79 .15 . .64 .04
li_bur_er .76 .00 1.00 .20
l__m_n .78 .07 .71 .10
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
------ ----
Ambiguity* Difficulty^
_a_rot .78 .14 . .64 .08
f_u_t .78 .07 .71 .07
dl___er .76 .14 .62 .07
h_ _ey .76 .01 .75 .17
v_ _1 .74 .11 .63 .06
chi_[ _en .73 .00 1.00 .11
_uppe_ .73 .15 .58 .10
lun___ .69 .27 .42 .03
squ_s_ .67 .07 .60 .16
mu___on .67 .00 1.00 .25
h_ng_r .67 .30 .37 .02
_ut_er .67 .26 .41 .04
bu___er .65 .20 .45 .10
SP_ _n .64 .10 .54 .12
_ _avy .62 .18 .44 .16
_a_try .61 .01 .60 .23
_nio_ .57 .05 .52 .34
pa_t_jr .54 .15 .39 .22
sal___ .48 .34 .14 .08
s_la_ .44 .12 .33 .36
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
Ambiguity* Difficulty^
s___ce .42 .34 .08 .14
pe_ __er .41 .16 .25 .17
end__v_ .37 .00 1.00 .58
b_e_d .36 .39 .03 .22
_ak_ .34 .55 .21 .08
_e_f .31 .52 .21 .15
be___ .28 .65 .37 .07
_in_er .25 .63 .38 .03
.24 .67 .43 .03
_a_on .23 .41 .18 .22
h_n_er .22 .50 .28 .15
s_e_k .22 .51 .29 .18
b___t .19 .53 .07
m_a_ .19 .47 .28 .25
fi_ _ .18 .75 .57 .02
t_a_t .17 .22 .05 .50
br_n_h .14 .70 .56 .12
_a_ing .13 .57 .44 .13
_  __ster .12 .75 .63 .07
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Skeleton
Words
P Food 
Response
P Nonfood 
Response
Ambiguity* Difficulty^
8___w .11 .62 .51 .22
s_l_ .11 .80 .69 .05
___ok .11 .79 .68 .07
_rip_ .08 .64 .56 .18
_ra_ .07 .60 .53 .21
_in_ .07 .74 .67 .14
_o_d .07 .86 .79 .04
_ic_ .06 .76 .71 .13
_a_e .05 .83 .78 .10
8_ar_e .03 .40 .37 .44
_i_k .02 .75 .73 .14
h_s_ .01 .80 .79 .16
P_r__ .01 .79 .78 .13
Difference between P Food and P Nonfood responses, except 
where no nonfood response is possible, in which case ambiguity is 
tabulated as minimal— 1.00--for present purposes. The smaller the 
value of entries in this column, the greater the ambiguity of the 
stimulus item, in this special sense of the word.
Probability of nonresponse. Nonword responses are excluded. 
Therefore, row entries do not total 1.00.
APPENDIX D
Frequency Distributions of Category Responses (CR) , Noncategory 
Responses (NCR), and Nonresponses (NR) of One Control Group 
and Four Experimental Groups to Six Sets of Stimuli
Control Group Subjects (n = 40)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
V
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
9 0 13 0 1 1 0 0 4 0
8 0 4 0 2 2 0 1 10 0
7 0 11 0 2 0 2 0 8 0
6 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 10 1
5 0 0 0 6 11 4 0 4 1
4 0 0 0 6 9 2 0 0 4
3 0 0 0 13 3 5 6 r " 5
2 0 0 4 1 7 8 11 0 5
1 0 0 13 6 4 14 12 0 13
0 40 0 23 0 1 5 10 1 11
Response
Totals 0 379 21 160 156 84 60 275 65
Response
Means 0.00 9.48 0.52 4.00 3.91 2.09 1.50 6.87 1.63
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Control Group Subjects (n = 40)
(Continued)
'
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
- CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 6 0 0 13 0 0 0 0
9 0 11 0 0 12 0^ 3 0 0
8 0 12 0 0 5 0 2 0 0
7 0 4 1 0 5 0 1 4 0
6 0 4 0 0 2 0 10 1 0
5 0 1 1 0 3 3 10 7 1
4 0 0 2 0 0 2 6 13 1
3 1 2 4 0 0 5 4 8 5
2 0 0 6 0 0 5 3 2 4
1 12 0 17 0 0 12 i 4 14
0 27 0 9 40 0 13 0 1 15
Response
Totals 15 324 61 0 340 60 203 151 46
Response
Means 0.38 8.10 1.52 0.00 8.50 1,50 5.08 3,78 1.14
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Experimental Group:
Deduction-All Subjects (n = 50)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 321 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 14 0 11 0 0 2 1 1
8 0 4 0 14 0 0 4 4 0
7 0 0 0 9 0 0 4 1 3
6 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 2 2
5 0 0 0 4 0 2 12 2 4
4 0 0 0 3 3 3 8 3 4
3 0 0 0 2 1 11 4 7 13
2 0 0 4 0 4 13 4 6 7
1 0 0 14 0 17 13 5 13 10
0 50 0 32 0 25 8 1 11 6
Response
Totals 0 478 22 366 40 94 231 128 141
Response
Means 0.00 9.56 0.44 7.32 0.80 1.88 4.62 2.56 2.82
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Experimental Group:
Deduction-All Subjects (n = 50)
(Continued)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 1 0 0 9 0 1 0 0
9 0 7 0 0 14 0 8 0 0
8 0 11 0 0 12 0 8 0 0
7 0 10 2 0 6 2 10 0 0
6 0 9 1 0 5 1 6 2 0
5 0 3 4 0 1 1 6 4 1
4 0 6 6 0 1 5 6 4 6
3 3 1 7 0 2 6 3 7 6
2 10 2 13 0 0 12 1 15 6
1 15 0 14 0 0 14 1 11 13
0 22 0 3 50 0 9 0 7 18
Response
Totals 44 330 126 0 399 101 318 110 72
Response
Means 0.88 6.60 2.52 0.00 7.98 2.02 6.36 2.20 1.44
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Experimental Group:
Deduction'Most Subjects (n = 50)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 37 0 7 0 0 1 1 0
9 0 10 0 11 0 0 1 3 0
8 0 2 0 5 0 1 3 1 0
7 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 4 2
6 0 1 0 11 0 0 7 1 2
5 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 4 6
4 0 0 1 1 2 3 4 3 6
3 0 0 0 1 1 12 5 8 10
2 0 0 2 0 4 7 10 6 6
1 0 0 10 1 16 13 5 13 10
0 50 0 37 0 26 13 3 6 8
Response
Totals 0 472 18 372 40 88 208 160 132
Response
Means 0.00 9.44 0.56 7.44 0.80 1.76 4,16 3.20 2.64
112
APPENDIX D (Continued)
Experimental Group:
Deduction-Most Subjects (n = 50)
(Continued)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 7 0 0 27 0 3 0 0
9 0 7 0 0 4 0 6 0 0
8 0 14 0 0 7 0 2 0 0
7 0 9 0 0 5 0 7 0 1
6 0 5 1 0 5 1 10 6 0
5 0 6 6 0 1 1 7 4 1
4 0 1 3 0 1 5 6 12 4
3 1 1 5 0 0 5 4 7 1
2 4 0 11 0 0 7 2 8 4
1 12 0 17 0 4 2 2 7 17
0 33 0 7 50 0 27 1 6 22
Response
Totals 23 375 102 0 436 64 286 158 56
Response
Means 0.46 7.50 2.40 0.00 8.72 1.28 5.72 3.16 1.12
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Experimental Group:
Induction-All Subjects (n = 90)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 69 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 0
9 17 0 0 8 0 0 0 2 0
8 3 0 0 9 1 1 2 13 1
7 1 0 0 13 2 1 2 11 3
6 0 0 0 17 1 2 5 14 4
5 0 0 0 14 4 1 8 9 5
4 0 0 0 11 7 11 14 14 10
3 0 0 1 7 18 11 11 6 14
2 0 0 3 3 18 25 22 9 14
1 0 0 17 0 19 18 18 3 28
0 0 90 69 2 20 20 8 8 11
Response
Totals 874 0 26 538 185 177 249 433 218
Response
Means 9.71 0.00 0.29 5.98 2.06 1.96 2.77 4.81 2.42
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Experimental Group:
Induction-All Subjects (n = 90)
(Continued)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 6 0 0 26 0 3 0 0
9 0 19 0 0 19 0 7 0 0
8 0 25 0 0 19 0 9 1 0
7 0 20 1 0 17 0 11 2 1
6 0 11 3 0 6 0 18 6 0
5 0 4 3 0 3 3 12 11 0
4 0 4 5 0 0 6 11 22 4
3 1 1 20 0 0 17 7 21 8
2 4 0 20 0 0 19 8 11 16
1 25 0 28 0 0 19 3 10 26
0 60 0 10 90 0 26 1 6 34
Response
Totals 36 676 188 0 753 147 492 298 110
Response
Means 0.40 7.51 2.09 0.00 8,37 1.63 5.47 3.31 1.22
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Experimental Group:
Induction-Most Subjects (n = 90)
Stimulus Sets
Frequency Set 1 Set 2 Sat 3
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
9 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 3 0
8 71 0 0 8 1 0 0 8 1
7 14 0 0 12 0 5 0 9 1
6 3 0 0 10 2 2 4 18 2
5 2 0 0 14 10 8 11 16 9
4 0 0 0 13 13 10 13 15 16
3 0 0 2 11 17 8 12 4 12
2 0 89 3 6 16 21 16 9 17
1 0 1 15 6 18 24 20 4 19
0 0 0 70 1 13 12 14 2 13
Response
Totals 694 179 27 459 225 216 219 456 225
Response
Means 7.71 1.99 0.30 5.10 2.50 2.40 2.43 5.07 2.50
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Experimental Group:
Induction-Most Subjects (n = 90)
(Continued)
Frequency
Stimulus Sets
Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
CR NCR NR CR NCR NR CR NCR NR
10 0 11 0 0 25 0 2 0 0
9 0 21 0 0 18 0 4 0 0
8 0 20 0 0 18 1 9 0 0
7 0 20 1 0 14 0 12 2 2
6 0 8 2 0 5 5 11 8 0
5 0 5 7 0 4 4 17 16 4
4 \ 0 4 6 0 5 5 14 14 4
3 0 1 13 0 0 14 15 18 12
2 1 0 21 0 1 18 4 18 11
1 22 0 26 0 0 18 2 9 21
0 67 0 14 90 0 25 0 5 36
Response
Totals 24 691 185 0 726 174 474 297 129
Response
Means 0.46 6.78 2.06 0.00 8.07 1.93 5.27 3.30 1.43
APPENDIX E
Frequency Distributions of Proportions of Responses Made 
that were Category Responses, per Subject, to Six 
Sets of Stimuli, in One Control Group and 
Four Experimental Groups
Control Group (n = 40)
Category
Responses
Proportion
Stimulus Sets
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
1.00 0 1 1 0 0 1
.90 - ,99 0 0 0 0 0 3
.80 “ .89 0 4 0 0 0 3
.70 - .79 0 2 0 0 0 1
.60 - .69 0 6 0 0 0 12
.50 - .59 0 6 0 0 0 7
.40 - .49 0 8 0 0 0 7
.30 - .39 0 9 7 1 0 2
.20 - .29 0 1 11 0 0 4
.10 - .19 0 3 11 12 0 0
.00 - .09 40 0 10 27 40 0
Total of
Frequencies 40 40 40 40 40 40
Total of 
Proportions 0 20.01 7.10 1.67 0 2.275
Mean of ^ 
Proportions .000 .500 .178 .042 .000 .569
Totals and means of proportions were computed from ungrouped data,
and will not agree exactly with totals and means computed from these
grouped <La :a.
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Experimental Group:
Deduction-All Subjects (n = 50)
Category
Response
Proportion
Stimulus Sets
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
’ 1.00 0 25 11 0 0 7
.90 - .99 0 4 1 0 0 5
.80 - .89 0 14 10 0 0 11
.70 - .79 0 2 5 0 0 11
.60 - .69 0 2 6 0 0 4
.50 - .59 0 1 5 0 0 7
.40 - .49 0 2 2 3 0 3
.30 - .39 0 0 1 4 0 1
.20 - .29 0 0 4 10 0 0
.10 - .19 0 0 4 11 0 1
.00 - .09 50 0 1 22 50 0
Total of
Frequencies 50 50 50 50 50 50
Total of 
Proportions .00 44.84 33.17 6.22 .00 36.79
Mean of ^ 
Proportions .000 .897 .663 .124 .000 .736
Totals and means of proportions were computed from ungrouped
data, and will not agree exactly with totals and means computed from
these grouped data.
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Experimental Group:
Deduction-Most Subjects (n = 50)
Category
Response
Proportion
Stimulus Sets
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
i.po 0 26 6 0 0 5
.90 - .99 0 3 1 0 0 5
.80 - .89 0 14 9 0 0 3
.70 - .79 0 2 7 0 0 9
.60 - .69 0 3 5 0 0 9
.50 - .59 0 1 3 0 0 9
.40 - .49 0 0 3 1 0 4
.30 - .39 0 1 3 1 0 4
.20 - .29 0 0 7 3 0 1
.10 - .19 0 0 3 12 0 0
.00 - .09 50 0 3 33 50 1
Total of
Frequencies 50 50 50 50 50 50
Total of 
Proportions .00 45.02 28.94 2.87 .00 32.33
Mean of ^ 
Proportions .000 .900 .579 .057 .000 .647
Totals and means of proportions were computed from ungrouped
data, and will not agree exactly with totals and means computed
from these grouped data.
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Experimental Groups
Induction-All Subjects (n = 90)
Category
Response Stimulus Sets
Proportions Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
1.00 90 20 8 0 0 6
.90 - .99 0 1 0 0 0 6
.80 - .89 0 18 3 0 0 10
.70 - .79 0 18 5 0 0 11
.50 - .69 • 0 14 6 0 0 23
.50 - .59 0 11 10 0 0 13
.40 - .49 0 4 8 1 0 6
.30 - .39 0 0 8 0 0 6
.20 - .29 0 2 19 4 0 5
.10 - .19 0 0 15 25 0 3
.00 - .09 0 2 8 60 0 1
Total of 
Frequencies 90 ■"90 90 90 90 90
Total of 
Proportions 90.00 66.31 35.79 4.32 .00 55.48
Mean of ^ 
Proportions 1.00 .737 .398 .048 .000 .616
Totals and means of proportions were computed from ungrouped
data, and will not agree exactly with totals and means computed from
these grouped data.
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Experimental Group:
Induction-Most Subjects (n = 90)
Category
Response
Stimulus Sets
Proportion Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
1.00 0 13 2 0 0 5
.90 - .99 0 3 0 0 0 4
.80 - .89 71 16 2 0 0 11
.70 - .79 19 9 2 0 0 13
.60 - .69 0 16 11 0 0 18
.50 - .59 0 14 10 0 0 15
.40 - .49 0 5 10 0 ' 0 10
.30 - .39 0 7 8 0 0 10
.20 - .29 0 4 14 3 0 4
.10 - .19 0 2 17 20 0 0
.00 - .09 0 1 14 67 90 0
Total of 
Frequencies 90 90 90 90 90 90
Total of ^ 
Proportions 71.48 45.02 30.17 2.93 .00 55.21
Mean of ^ 
Proportions .794 .662 .335 .033 .000 .613
Totals and means of proportions were computed from ungrouped
data, and will not agree exactly with totals and means computed from
these grouped data.
